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Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) eliminate t he need for pre-exis ting infrastructure by
relying on t he nodes to perform all network services . The connectivity between t he nodes is
spo radic due to t he share d, err or-prone wireless medium and frequent route failures cause d
by node mobility. Fully self-organized MANETs are creat ed solely by the end-users for
a common purpose in an ad hoc fashion. Forming peer-to-p eer security associat ions in
MANETs is more challenging than in conventional networks du e to the lack of cent ral
aut hority.
This thesis is mainly conce rned with peer- to-p eer key man agement in fully self-organized
~IANETs. A key management pro to col 's primary fun ction is to bootstrap and maintain
the security associat ions in the network , hence to create, dis tribute and rcvo catc (sym -
metric or asymmet ric) keying m at eri al as needed by the network security services . The
.fully self-organized feature means that t he key management protocol cannot rely on any
form of off-line or on-line trusted third party (TTP).
The first part of t he t hes is gives an introduction to MANETs and highligh ts rvIANETs'
main characteristics and applica t ions. The t hes is follows with an overall perspective on t he
security issu es in MANETs and motivates the import an ce of solving the key m an agemen t
problem in MANETs.
The second part gives a comprehensive survey on the exist ing key management protocols
in MANETs. The protocols are subdivided into groups Lased on t heir main characteristic
or design strategy. Discussion and comments are provided on t he strategy of each gr oup.
The discussions give insight into t he state of t he ar t and show resear chers t he way forward.
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The t hird par t of t he t hes is prop oses a novel peer- to-peer key management scheme for
fully self-organized rVIANETs, called Self-Organized Peer-to-Peer Key Managem ent (Self-
Org P KlvI). The scheme has low implementation complexity and provides self-organized
ruechanisms for certificate dissemination and key renewal without t he necd for any form
of off-line or on-line aut hority.
The fully distributed scheme is superior in communicat ion and comput at ional overhead
with respect to it s counte rparts . All nodes send and receive the same number of messages
and complet e the same amount of computation. ScifOrgPKM therefore preserves the
symmetric relationship between the nodes. Each node is its own authority domain whi ch
provides an adversary with no convenient point of attack.
SelfOrgPKM solves t he classical routing-security interdependency problem and mitigat es
impersonation attacks by providing a st rong one-to-one binding between a user 's cert ificate
information and public key. The prop osed scheme uses a novel certificate exchange mecha-
nism t hat exploits user mobili ty but does not rely on mobility in anyway. The proposed
certificate exchange mechanism is ideally suited for boot straping t he rou ting security. It
enables nod es to setup security associations on the network layer in a localized fashion
withou t any noti ceable t ime delay.
The t hes is also introduces two generic cryptographic building blocks as t he basis of SelfOrg-
PKM: 1) A vari ant on the ElGamal typ c signat ure scheme develop ed from the gene ralized
ElGamal signature scheme introduced by Horster et al. The modified scheme is one of the
most efficient ElGamal variants , outpcrforming mos t other variant s; and 2) A subordinate
public key generation scheme .
The t hesis introduces t he novel notion of subordinate public keys , whi ch allows the users of
SelfOrgP KM to perform self-organized, self-certificate revocation wit hou t changing their
network ident ifiers / addresses . Subordinate pu blic keys t herefo re elimi nate t he main weak-
ness of previous efforts to solve the address ownership problem in Mobile IPv6. Further-
more, t he main weakness of previous efforts to break t he routing-security interdep endence
cycle in MANETs is also eliminated by a subordinate public key mec hanism.
v
T he presented EIG am al signature var iant is proved secure in the Random Oracle and
Gcneric Security Model (ROM+ GrvI) wit hout making any unrealisti c assumptions . It
is shown how the strong secur ity of the signature scheme supports the secur ity of the
proposed subo rdinate key generation scheme . Based Oll thc secure signature scheme a
security argument for SelfOrgP KM is provided with resp ect to a genera l, act ive insider
adversary model.
The only operat ion of SelfOrgPKM affecting the network is the pairwise exchange of
cert ificate s. The cry ptographic correctness, low implementation complexity and effect ive-
ness of SelfOrgPKM were verified though extensive simulations using ns-2 and OpenSSL.
Thorough analysis of the simulat ion resul ts shows t hat t he localized certificate exchange
mechani sm on the network layer has negligible imp act on network performan ce. The
simulation results also correlate with efficiency analysis of SclfOrgP KM in an ideal net-
work setting, hence assuming guaranteed connectivity. The simulation resul ts furthermo re
demonstrate that network layer certificate exchanges can be t riggered wit hout extending
routing pr otocol control packets.
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ARa result of significant advances in mobile comput ing and wireless communication te ch-
nology, mobile devi ces have gained sufficient communicat ion, comput at ional and memory
resources to be interconnected. By definition mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) diffe-
rentiate themselves from exist ing networks by the fact that they rely on no fixed infr a-
structure [1]: the network has no base stations, access points, remote servers etc . All
network fun ctions are performed by the nodes forming the network ; each node performs
the fun ctionality of host and router , relaying dat a to establish connectivity between source
and destination nodes not dir ectl y within each other's transmission range.
MANETR arc auto nomous, multi-hop networks interconnected via wireless links, The word
ad hoc (t ranslate d as for this only from Latin) implies that the network is form ed in a
spontaneous manner to meet an immediate demand and sp ecific goal. Fully self-organized
MANETs are created solely by the end-users for a common purpose in an ad hoc fashi on.
Fully self-orga nized MANETs can be informally visualized as a gr oup of strangers, peopl e
who have never met before, coming together for a common purpose. These people have
no prior relationships and share no common keying material on their nodes. Users there-
fore have to establish secur ity assoc iat ions between themselves , afte r network formation ,
without the aid of a common off-line trusted third party (T T P ). Furthermore, once the
network is operational, t here is no form of on-line TTP to perform any key man agement
1
Chapter- I . Introducti on
services . The network is therefore operate d and managed by t he nodes t hemselves, whi ch
makes MANETs depend ent up on the co-operative and trusting nature of nodes [7]. The
autonomous nature of mobile ad hoc networks or alte rnatively stated, the requirement
that the network is operated primarely by the end-users, is generally referred t o as sclr
organization [3] [5]. This feature makes ad hoc networks financially viabl e since t here is
no cost involved in sett ing up or maint aining a network architecture.
Mobile ad hoc networks have a dynamic network topology. Since nodes in the network s are
mobile, with unrestrict ed movement , the configuration of the network t opology can change
very rapidly. The position of the nodes relative to each ot her may exhibit a randomly
changing nature and therefore be considered as unpredict able. The lack of infrastruc-
ture, dyn amic network to pology and error-prone wireless connectivity resul t in frequent
link breakages implyin g sporadic connectivity. Proto cols for MANETs t herefore need to
miti gate the unreliabili ty of basic network services by taking on a fully distributed , self..
organizing nature. From a security persp ective, distribut ing the fun ctionality of network
services to as many nodes as possible, avoids a single point of attack.
Considering the uni que features of ad hoc networks, it is expected t hat the mechanisms
proposed to guarantee the secur ity of convent iona l wireline networks are not necessaril y
suitable or adaptable to MANETs. Special mechanisms and protocols designed speci fically
for ad hoc network s are necessary.
1.1 Scope of Research
T his work focuses on peer-to-peer or pairwise key management in pure or fully se lf-
organized mobile ad hoc networks . As ment ioned above, by definition, fully self-organize d
MAN ETs do not rely on any form of TTP to set up security associations [3] [5]. A fully
self..organized MANET is an "open" network: any user wit h the appropriate equipment
(and software) can join and leave at random ; there is no form of access cont rol. Such a
network will t herefore not find application in , for exa mple, hostil e military environments ,
but rather in commercial, community-base d environments.
2
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1.2 Outline of Thesis
T he t hesis is organized as follows:
1.2.1 Chapter-2
In Chapter-2, the characterist ics of mobile ad hoc network s are discussed from a secur ity
perspective. Some MANET applications in commercial and milit ar y settings are identified .
Afte r discussing t he main secur ity goals, t he general adversary model assumed throughout
the thesis is det ailed. To illustrate t he capability of adversaries in an ad hoc set ting a
selection of the current attacks against MANETs is discussed . Chapter-2 is ended by giving
an overview of the issues in t he MANET secur ity field . The purpose of key man agement
is identified from these secur ity areas, t hereby motivat ing t he significance of this research .
1.2.2 Chapter-3
III Chapter-S, t he existi ng lit erature on key management for MANETs is investi gat ed .
St ructure is provided to the discussion by dividing the exist ing schemes int o groups, based
on the schemes ' main characterist ics. Each group is introduced by analysing at least t he
origina l protocol that inspired the subset . This ap proach allows the reader to form a global
pcrscctive on the existing pairwi se key management solut ions for MANETs.
1.2.3 Chapter-4
Chapter-4 is dedicated to the main cont ribut ion of this t hesis. A new peer-to-p eer key
management scheme called, Self-organized Peer- to-Peer Key Managemant (SelfOrgPKM),
is proposed. SelfOrgP KM is specifically designed for fully self-organized MANETs, i.e.
MANETs that do not rely on any form of t ru sted aut hority. As building blo cks for
SelfOrgP KM the noti on of subordinate public keys and a var iant on t he ElGamal signa t ure
scheme is presented. T hese building blocks may find applicatio n in various ot her secur ity
schemes .
3
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1.2.4 C hapter-5
In Chapt er-S, a strong security argument for SclfOrgPKM is pr esented , Secondly, t he
communicat ion and computat iona l cost of SelfOrgPKM are analyzed in an ideal setting.
The effect iveness of SclfOrgPKM was verified through simulat ion . Chapter-S pr esents
the simulation resul ts in det ail. Lastl y, t he impact of SelfOrgP KM's certificat e exchange
mechani sm on network performan ce is evaluated .
1. 2. 5 Chapt er-6
In Chapter-6 the discussions are concluded, t he t hesis ' main contributions are sum marized
and future dir ecti ons of resear ch ar e provided .
4
Chapter 2
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
2. 1 Characteristics of Mobile Ad Hoc N etworks
It is import ant to acknowledge the properties or characterist ics of mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) , since these properties have a significant impact on the design of secur ity
protocols for MANETs. Although these properti es are det ailed in various pap ers [8] [3]
[9] [10], security proto cols t hat do not suit t hese characterist ics are frequently published .
The t hesis is t herefore started by defining t he characterist ics of MANETs. The secur ity
implicati ons of the characteristics are discussed where applicable.
2.1. 1 N etwork Infrastructure
There is no fixed or pr e-exis ting infr ast ru ctur e in an ad hoc network: all network function-
ality (rout ing , secur ity, network man agement etc.) is performed by the nodes t hemselves.
Du e to t he nod es' limited t ransmission range , dat a disseminat ion is achieved in a mul t i-
hop fashion; nod es can therefore be considered as host s and routers. Although t he lack
of infrastructure op ens a new window of opportunity for attacks, t he author be lieves t he
lack of infrastructure can help to ensure the survivability of the network in a very hostil e
environment . This holds t rue not only from a network securi ty perspective, but also when
5
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the users of the netwo rk are under physical attack (see Secti on-2 .2.1).
Ad hoc networks may be spontaneously formed with no a priori knowledge of the physical
location and networking environment. l'vIANETs' lack of infr astructure thus makes it
suitable for various ap plications where convent iona l networks fall short (see Section-2.2).
Sume researchers have already addressed secur ity issues in hybrid ad hoc networks (for
example [11]). Hybrid ad hoc networks combine convent iona l network infras t ructure with
mu lti -hopping. T his derivative uf ad hoc networks will find usefu l applicat ion where fixed
infr ast ru cture can be extended through mul ti-hop network s or where the functi onality (and
performance) uf mu lti -hop networks can be enhanced by relying on some infr astructure.
2.1.2 N etwork Topology
Nodes in ad hoc networks may be mobile resul ting in a dyn ami c, weakly connected topo-
logy. Since node mobility is unrestricted , the topology may be unpredict able. The net -
work will however demonstrate global mobili ty patterns which may not be complete ly
random [5] .
The to pology is weakly connected du e to t ransient, error-prone wireless connect ivity. The
users may therefore experience un availabili ty of essent ial secur ity serv ices. Nude mobility
and wireless connectivity allow nod es to spontaneously join and leave the network, whi ch
makes the network amorp hous , Security serv ices must be able to scale seamlessly with
rapid changes in network density.
2.1.3 Self-Organization
MANETs cannot rely on any form of central administ ration or control; t his is essential to
avoid a single point of attack [1]. A self-organized MANET cannot rely on any form of
off-line t ru sted third party (TTP) ; the network can thus be initi alized by a distributed
on -lin e TTP. A pure or f ully self-organi zed l'vIANET docs not rely on anyforrn of TTP
whatsoever [3] [5], i.e. the on-line TTP is also eliminated . Nodes will t herefore only have
6
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compatible devices wit h the same soft ware inst alled . In the extreme case, the nodes will
not even share a common set of security system parameters . T he lack of a TTP may
force the end-users to actively participate in the set up of secur ity associat ions. A (fully)
self-organized. MANET has some inherent secur ity implicati ons:
• Fully self-organize d. MANETs are "open" in nature: similar to t he internet: any
user can join the network at random. Access cont rol to applications will have to be
provided at the applicat ion layer with a varying degree of user interaction.
• Each user will he it s own author ity domain , hence responsible for generating and.
dist ributing its own keying material. As pointed out by Douceur [12], any nod e can
gene rate more than one identi ty when thcrc is no off-line TTP. It is thus clear that
it will be very difficult (if not imp ossible) to limit users to one and only one unique
ident ity in a (fully) self-organized setting.
• The network will always be vulnerable to the act ive insider adversary (see Section-
2.3.2). In fact, t he Dolev-Yao adversary model [13] is too restrictive [14], for example,
it fails to capture information an adversary may gain from detailed kn owledge of t he
protocols in use. An interesting topic for future research will be t he adversary model
in "open" ad hoc network s.
• It will be difficult to hold malicious nodes accountable for their actions , since they
can always rejoin the network under a different (new) identity.
2.1.4 Limited R esources
Nodes have limited computationa l, memory and energy resour ces in cont rast to t heir
wired predecessors. Nodes are small hand-held devices (possibly "off-the-shelf" consumer
elect ronics) that do not hinder user mobility. In an at te mpt to keep the cost of these
devices low, they are normally powered by a small CP U, accompanied by limited memory
reso urces . As the devices are mobile they are bat tery operated. This often resul t s in short
on t imes and the possibili ty of power failure due to bat tery exhaustion , perhaps during
execut ion of a network related function.
7
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Devices may have limited bandwidth and t ra nsmission ranges. If it is assumed that ad-
vances in integrated circuit (LC] technology will keep on following Moore's law, compu-
tational and memory limitations will be alleviated in a matter of t ime . Bandwidth and
t ransmission range (in the case of communicat ion via radio t ransmissions) are unlikely to
improve dramatically with respect to power consumpt ion as both are dependent on Shan-
non 's law and thus limited [IG]. In ord er to achieve a higher bandwidth, a higher signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) is required which in turn requires higher transmission power [15].
Higher t ransmission power significantly depletes battery power , whi ch is unlikely to im-
prove significantly given the curre nt rate of advancement in bat tery technology [16] .
A security protocol that fails to optimize nod e and network resources will simply not be
adopte d in pr acti ce.
2.1.5 Poor Physical Security
Nod es are mobile and there fore cannot be locked up in a secure roo m or closet . These sm all
hand-held devices are easily compromised by either being lost or stolen. It is therefore
highly probable than an adversary can physically compromise onc or more nodes and
perform any number of tests and analysis. The adversary can also use t he nodes to attack
distributed network servi ces, such as a distributed on-line certificate authority [1]. Poor
physical securi ty is not as relevant in "open" MANETs: the adversaries do not have to
physically captur e nodes to become an insider or to perform analysis on the protocols. The
poor physical secur ity may resul t in serious problems in "closed" , military ty pe MANETs
where physically compromised nodes can be used to launch active, insider attacks on the
network.
2.1.6 Shared Physical Medium
The wireless communication medium is accessible to any ent ity wit h the appropriate equip-
ment and adequate resources. Accor dingly, access to the channel cannot be restrict ed .
Adversaries are therefore able to eavesdro p on communication and inject bogus messages
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into the network without limi t ation . The shared channel and the nodes' po or physical
secur ity again emphasize that secur ity mechanisms must be able to deal with the worst
case active, insider adversa ry.
2.1.7 Distributed System
Considering the above properti es, nod es in ad hoc networks have a symmetric relation-
ship . This imp lies that they are all equa l and t herefore should equally distribute all of the
responsibilit ies of providing network funct ions . This is not only for secur ity reasons but
to ensure reliable, available network servi ces that places the same burden on the compu-
tational, memory and energy resour ces of all network par ti cipants [1] [3]. It is ant icipated
that a fair distributions of services will also help to alleviate selfishness [7].
2.2 Applications of Mobile Ad Hoc N etworks
To unders t and the nature of MANETs and the origin of their unique characterist ics, t he
potent ial applications of ad hoc networks are bri efly considered .
Ad hoc net works have applicat ions in two major fields: milit ar y and commercial environ-
ments.
2.2.1 M ili tary A p p lications
The origin of networks t hat rely on no pre-existi ng infrastructure can be trac ed back to
the early 1970s with the DARPA and PRNET projects [17J [10], where the initial focus
was on milit ar y applications.
T he application of ad hoc networks in a mili tar y environment is par t icularl y att ractive
because of their lack of infr astructure and self-organiz ing nature. Consider convent iona l
network s that rely on infi:astructure such as base stations : the infrastructure introduces
po ints of vu lnerabili ty which may be attacked and , if eliminate d, dism antle the operation
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of the ent ire network. In battlefield scena rios robust and guaranteed communication is
essent ial with potenti ally fatal consequences if compromised . Ad hoc networks can con-
t inue to exist even in the event of nodes disappearing or becoming disconnected du e to
poor wireless connectivity, moving out of range, physical attack on users, broken nodes ,
bat tery depleti on or physical node dam age.
Applications such as sensor networks [18], posi tional communicat ion systems [19] [20] and
tactical ad hoc networks [21] will cont inue to be one of the driving forces behind ad hoc
network development.
2.2.2 Commercial Applications
Commercial applications of ad hoc networks may include deployment of connectivity in
te rrains where convent iona l network s, such as cellular networks , are not financially viabl e,
cannot provid e sufficient coverage or need by-pass ing.
P rivate network s or personal area networks (for the purpose of te leconferencing , video con-
ferencing, peer-to-p eer communications, ad hoc meetings, or more generally, collaborative
applications of all kinds) are possibl e applicat ions of ad hoc networks. It is ant icipated
that these applications will gain momentum as soon as the flexibility and convenience of
self-organized ad hoc networking is fully appreciate d and protocols are implemented with
commercially available products. Take for example cellular networks, what was once seen
as an impracti cal technology has now become a necessity.
Emergency situat ions caused by geopolit ical inst abili ty, natural or man-m ade disas ter
could resul t in existing network ing infrastructure being dam aged or unreliable. For exam-
ple, Hurri cane Katrina st ruck New Orleans, Louisiana on August 29, 2005. The storm
dest royed most of the fixed comm unication infrastructure as it blanketed approximately
90,000 square miles of the Unites States, a region almost as large as the United King-
dom [22J. In order to launch an effective disaster relief operation , communication is of
the essence , even between a localized group of relief workers . "Open" MANETs will make
it possible for relief workers from var ious count r ies to establish comm unication on t he
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fly, t herefore eliminating the time penalty in setting up and man aging conventional, fixed
infrastructure networks. Search and rescue missions could also be conducted in locati ons
not allowing access to existing communication networks.
Vehicu lar ad hoc networks allow vehicles t ravelling along a highway to exchange data for
traffic congestion moni torin g, inter vehicle communication and early warning of potenti al
dangers ahead such as an accident , road obstruction or stationary vehicle. Several research
projects have been initi at ed to deal with vehicular ad hoc networking [23] [24] [25].
2.3 Security Issues In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Secur ity is a fundamental issue that needs reso lution before ad hoc networks will exper ience
large scale deploym ent [1]. Vehicular ad hoc network ing is a good example of a MANET
application wit h some ser ious secur ity implicati ons [25]: failure of t he secur ity mechani sms
may resul t in the loss of human life. T he characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks, as given
in Sect ion-2 .1, pose numerous challenges in achieving convent ional security goals. Since
the nodes are resp onsibl e for bas ic network functi ons, like packet forwarding and routing ,
network operations can be easily jeopardized if countermeasures are not int egrat ed into
these network fun cti ons at the early stages of design. For examp le, some exist ing routing
protocols ( [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] ) for mobile ad hoc network s
may be ab le to manage the dyn ami c network topology of mobile ad hoc networks , but
none of these protocols incorporate mechan isms to prevent , to lerate or defend against
attacks from malicious adversaries. Due to the close relationship between secur ity and t he
characteristics of ad hoc networks these protocols will have to be fundament ally altered or
re-designed to effect ively incorporate security mechanisms. T his is clear if one considers
the number of secure rout ing protocols ( Ariadne [36], SEAD [37], ARAN [38], SRP [39]
SAODV [40] ) that followed t he insecur e routing protocols.
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2.3.1 Security Goals
The secur ity objectives for ad hoc networks are similar to those of convent iona l networks.
Ad hoc network secur ity should consider the following fundament al attributes (adapted
from [41] [1] [42]):
2.3.1.1 Confidentiality
Confident iality services protect information from being disclosed to un authorized ent it ies.
These services prevent enti t ies from using the information for personal gain or malicious
int ent .
2.3.1.2 Data Integrity
A guarantee of un corrupted message exchange must be provided . The dat a int egrity
ser vice should prevent or ena ble detection of dat a modificati on by both authorized and
unau thorized ent it ies.
2.3.1.3 Authentication
An authentication serv ice allows a node to verify the identi ty of the peer node with which
it is communicating . Authentication is not only applicable for verification of the peer
nod e's ident ity bu t also the content of the message exchanged. T hese attributes are
known as entity authent ication and data origin auth entication resp ectively, where t he
lat ter implicitl y incorp orates data integrity.
2.3.1.4 Non-repudiation
Non-repud iation services ensure that an ent ity cannot deny previous commitments or
actions . It binds an entity to messages , received and sent , which may infer participation
in a spec ific protocol.
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2.3.2 Adversary Model
Threat s to ad ho c networks or attacks on ad ho c networks can be launched by malicious
nodes as an outsider or insid er with resp ect to the network. A clear distinction should
11e made between outsider and insider adversaries, since each may use different t actics
to circumvent secur ity mechanisms and should be dealt with acco rdingly. Any security
protocol can only "guarantee" defence against an adversary t hat has been captured by its
adversary mod el.
2.3.2.1 Outsider Adversaries
Insid er adver saries are the most common adversaries; nod es t hat do not belong to t he
network with t he intent of harming t he network operation . Since an outsider does not
have access to impor t ant network information , t he attacks are normally based on t he
exploitation of t he characteristics of t he network or weaknesses in t he underlying pro tocols.
2.3.2.2 Insider Adversaries
Insid er adversaries are significantly more difficul t to defend against than outsider adver-
saries . T hese are malicious author ized nod es performing un au thorized actions . Wi th a
st rong non-repudiat ion service , an advantage of defending aga inst insid er adversar ies in
contrast to outsider adversaries , is that t he insider (malicious user ) is more easily identi-
fied if detect ed and held acco untable for malicious or unau thorized actions . On t he ot he r
hand, an insid er has access to additi onal information (for example keying materi al , rout-
ing information) and is possibly t rusted by ot her network nod es, making it easier for t he
node to breach confidentiality, corrupt fun dament al network function and manipulat e t he
cont ent of messages wit hout det ection.
In "open" or f ll11y self-organized MA NETs all malicious nod es can be regarded as insid er
adversaries .
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2.3.2 .3 Passive and Active Adversaries
Both outsider and insider adversaries can he classified as being eit her an act ive or passive
adversary. A passive adversary is only able to listen to (eavesdrop on) network traffic
wit hout disrupting protocol operation and uses the informati on gained to breach network
secur ity. An acti ve adversary, in addit ion, has full cont rol over t he communication channel,
making it possib le for the adversary to record and inject modifi ed or selected dat a into
the channel. This is normally done by a compromised authorized nod e or an adversary
impersonat ing an authorized node parti cipat ing in network operat ions, which implies t hat
insider adversaries are normally characterized as active adversaries.
2.3 .3 Attacks on Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
T he unique characterist ics of MANETs give an adversary the opportunity to lau nch nu-
merous attacks against ad hoc networks. When designing protocols for MANETs it is
impor t ant to be aware of exist ing at tacks . In "open" or fully self-organized MANETs, an
adversary may take on as many identi t ies as needed , t he number being limited only by
its available resources [12]. It is ant icipated that future research will identify new at tacks
on "open" MANETs or at leas t nullify defence mechan isms against existi ng at tacks. For
example, holding nod es accountable for their act ions is temporary in "open" MANET s: if
the node is excluded due to misb ehavior the attacker can rejo in t he net work with a new
identity.
2.3 .3 .1 Eavesdropping/Traffic analysis
Eavesdropping is t he most common at tack where a passive adversary listens in on the
communication. This attack can be successfully imp lemented in most netwo rks , however
in wireless networks it becomes eas ier as the adversary does not have to physically con-
nect to the medium, hut can monitor t he t raffic between communication ent it ies from a
"safe" distance. Since the adversary in general (and particularly in the case of commercial
networks) can obtain the necessary couununicat ion equipment to demo dulate t he signal,
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encryption remains t he most effective solution to defend aga inst eavesdropping .
2.3.3.2 D enial of Service
In denial of service (DoS) attacks t he adversary prevents or prohibits the normal use or
man agement of network faciliti es or functionality. DoS attacks can be launched at any
layer of an ad hoc network to exhaust node resources [1]. On the physical and medium
access cont rol layers a DoS attack, for example j amming, can be employed to impair
network availab ility. J amming occurs when a malicious node deliberately ema nates a
signal from a wireless device in order to overwhelm legitimate wireless signals [43] . On
the network layer an adversary could disrupt the rout ing fabric by manipulating rou ting
control packets. On higher layers an adversa ry could at t ack essent ial services, such as t he
key man agement protocol. DoS can also be caused by the constant requ est of network
services by an adversary - even if these services are denied. For example, hello flooding ,
can be seen as a ty pe of DoS attack. An attacker can use traffic diversion to cause lar ge
amount s of data to be sent to a vict im node from some set of nodes cont rolled by the
attacker [44].
2.3.3.3 Protocol A t t a cks
Most secur ity holes are discovered in protocols themselves although these protocols use
secure building blocks to provide their required functionality [41] [42]. An example of this
is insecure pro to cols without proposer authent icati on mechanisms, which can be at tacked
from both act ive insider and outsider adversaries (see Section-2.3. 2) .
2 .3 .3.4 Impersonation
Wi thout strong authentication mechanisms in place, insider or outside adversaries can
masquerade as an authorized user and attempt to access network services. This problem
becomes even more difficult to solve in "open" , fully self-orga nized MANETs which do
not have any form of access control. In Mobile IPvti a subset of this problem is referred
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to as the address ownership problem [45].
2.3 .3 .5 Cryptanalytic A t t acks
Cryptanalysis is t he study of mathematical techniques and procedures used to break cry p-
tographic techniques , procedures and algorithms , i.e. defeating t he objective of the in-
te nded service [41]. Adversaries exploit cryptana lyt ic techniques to discover cryptographic
keys or derive confidential informat ion from the recorded encrypted dat a sent between com-
munication ent it ies. These types of attacks are however seldomly used du e to cryptanalyt ic
complexity and/or vast computationa l and memory req uirements. The probability of a
secur ity hole existi ng elsewhere is generally much higher depending on what cryptographic
algorithms are used . A careful analysis is st ill essent ial when select ing cryptographic algo-
rithms to avoid a cryptanalyt ic attack. Factors to consider when choos ing a cryptographic
scheme are: is the algorithm widely used? How imp ort ant is the information it is protect-
ing? And does it have a good histo ry of crypt analysis? Successful cryptanalysis can also
be made more difficul t by limi ting the amount of information available for cryptanalysis.
For exa mple, ensur ing key fr eshness by independ ently changing encrypt ion keys between
communication sessions may significantly redu ce the poss ibility for attack [46].
2.3. 3.6 Wormhole Attacks
The wormhole attack is a severe attack against t he routing protocols of ad hoc networks
made poss ible by the shared wireless mediu m. In a wormhole attack, an adversary record s
packets (rout ing information) at one location in t he network, tunnels the recorded dat a
via a private network or connection to another location in the network , and re-transmi ts
the recorded data into the network [47] [48] . This disrupts the routing infrast ructure and
conse quently prevents a routing protocol, wit hout a protection mechanism , from finding
routes more than one or two hops from the node req uest ing ro ut ing services.
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2.3.3.7 SinkholejBlackhole Attacks
Dur ing a blackholc attack t he at tacker forms par t of the network and interferes in the
route discovery ph ase of the routing protocol [36]. By sending forged routing packets the
attacker rout es all packets for another destinat ion to it self. The at t acker then disrupts
the routing pro tocol by creating a rout ing blackhole or sinkhole in which all packets are
dropped. The at tacker could also select ively drop packets hy creating a gmyhole, for
example, by forwarding all routing packets but no dat a packets [36].
2.3.3.8 Stealth Attacks
Stealt h attacks, int ro du ced in [44], are classified into two classes. T he first class of attacks
at te mpts t o "hi-jack" or perform traffic ana lysis on filt ered traffi c to and from vict im nodes.
These attack are mounted , for example, by the modification of routing inform ation. An
attacker can diver t t raffic by using authentic rou ting messages to fool honest nodes into
disrupting t heir rout ing t ables.
The second class partitions the network and reduces goodput hy disconnecting victim
nodes in several ways. For example, the attacker can route a large amo unt of data t hrough
the vict im node. T his may totally consume the node's energy resources or create a per-
ception of un availabili ty due t he large quanti ties of messages being dr opped by t he victim.
Consequent ly the node under attack will not he used by neighboring routers and becomes
isolated .
T he methods are referred to as stealth attacks since they minimize the cost of launching
the attacks and reduce the visibility of the attacker.
2.3.3.9 Sybil Attacks
If a st rong one-to-one binding between the identi ty and physical ent it ies does not exist in a
communicat ion system (vouched for by an off-line trusted aut hority), it is always possibl e
for an unfamili ar ent ity to adopt more than one identi ty [12]. In a Sybil att ack, a single
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inconsist ent or malicious entity presents multiple identities and therefore could potentially
cont ro l a substant ial fra cti on of the system .
2.3.3.10 Rushing Attacks
A rushing attack resul t s in a deni al of service (DoS) when used against an on-dem and
routing protocol [49]. In on-demand rout ing protocols a nod e ini ti at es a route discovery
by flooding the network with a m ute 'request. To limit t he overhead , nodes in the network
forward only one route request originating from a specific route discovery. Assume nod e
A issues a route request t o est ablish a route to node B. If an attacker is first to forward
the m ute request to the neighboring nod es of node B t hen the route discovering ph ase will
always render a route of which the attacker is one hop. The attacker can thus pr event
the routing protocol from findin g any useful routes to node B by continuously rushing t he
route request to the neighb ors of node B. The rushing attack can also be used against
an on-demand rout ing protocol t hat predi ct ably forwards any routing request for a given
route discovery in contrast to a pr otocol in which nod e forwards only one route request [49].
2.3.3.11 Replay Attacks
In a replay attack on the routing infr astructure an adversary sends old route advertise-
me nts to a node causing it to updat e its routing table with stale routes [3rJ]. The at tacker
may also record packets sent between legitimate network nod es on t he application layer
and repl ay t hese recor ded packets in order to gain un au thorized access to network services
or overload a node with outdated informat ion resulting in denial of service.
2.3.3.12 Sleep Deprivation Torture
An adversary may inter act with a nod e in a "legit imate" way with t he purpose of consu-
ming it s battery power (energy resources). In ad hoc network s and particularly in sensor
networks [18], energy resources are severely limi ted (Sect ion-2.1). In order to conserve
power these nod es go into sleep mod e in which the channel is only periodically scanned
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for signals. During a sleep deprivat ion to rtur e attack , nod es are prevented from going
into sleep mode until t he battery of t he t arget device is fully depleted , leaving the node
disabled [50] [51].
2.3.3.13 Selfishness
Selfishness is an ad hoc network sp ecific at tack, falling un der the denial of service cate gory.
In an attempt t o save comput at ional, memory and energy resources, users may become self -
ish. Mechan isms are therefore needed to enforce co-operation or to provide some incentive
for nodes willing to part icipate in network op erat ions. The impact of selfish behavior in ad
hoc networks has been investigated and pr oven to seriously impair the network 's capability
to pr ovide essential serv ices such as routi ng [52] [7]. Various proposals have already been
mad e in lit erature to defend against selfish nod es [52] [53] [7] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59].
2.3.4 Open Problems in Mobile Ad Hoc Networking Security
Desp ite the evolution of IvIANETs over the past decad e there are still a number of securi ty
re lated problems that are open. This means that alt hough solutions have been proposed
none seem to sat isfy all of the const raints of MANETs . Figure-2.1 illustrates t he areas
invest igated within the MANET field with par ti cular focus on secur ity issucs. · Note that
this list highli ghts the main areas of ad hoc network secur ity and could be expanded .
As illust rated in Figur e-2.1, research in the MANET secur ity field is concerne d with a
variety of different aspects.
Resear chers in t he ad hoc network secur ity field init ially focused on secure routing pro-
tocols [1]. The focus of these protocols (Ariadne [30], SEAD [37], ARAN [38], SRP [39],
SAO DV [40]) is two-fold:
1. To provide a robust rout ing mechani sm against t he dyn am ic to po logy of MANETs.
2. To provide a rob ust rou ting mechanism against malicious nod es.
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Fi gure 2.1: Areas of interest in ad hoc networks
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Routing protocols use various security mechanisms to ensure robustness of the routing
scheme, Some of these mechanisms are list ed below:
1. Redundancy exploitation.
2. Diversity coding.
3. Authenticated route discovery and network nodes,
4. Guaranteed route discovery.
5. Route maintenan ce techniques.
6. Faul t or intrusion to lerant mechanisms.
7. Cry ptographic techniques, pro cedures, schemes, tools or mechani sm .
For example, routing schemes may exploit redundancy by establishing mul tiple rout es
h om source to destination (as eas ily achieved by ZRP [31], DSR [27], T ORA [29], AODV
[33]) [1]. By send ing dat a via all these rout es , t he redundancy will ensure that all dat a
arrives at t he destinati on. An alternative mechanism to sending dat a via redundant rout es
is diversity coding [60]. Diversity coding takes advantage of red un dant routes in a more
bandwidt h efficient way by not re-transmit t ing t he messages. Rather , it t ransmits limi t ed
redundant information t hro ugh addit iona l routes for t he purpose of error det ecti on and
correction.
All of these mechanisms have var ious degrees of effect iveness . It is widely acknowledged
that cryptographic tec hniques can provide some of the strongest mechanisms to ensure
the authenticity, integrity and confident iality of rout ing informat ion .
Secure key management wit h a high availability feat ure is at the cente r of providing
network security [41J. However , all routing schemes neglect the crucial task of secure key
management and assume pre-existence and pre-sharing of secret and/or private/public key
pairs [1] . This leaves key man agement considerations as an open resear ch area in the ad
hoc network secur ity field.
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A Survey on Peer-to-Peer Key
Management for Mobile Ad Hoc
Networks
3. 1 Introduction
T his chapter reviews the most popular peer-to-peer key management protocols proposed
to date for mobile ad hoc networks (MANET s). The pro tocols are sub-d ivided into groups
based on their design strategy or main characteristic. The existing schemes are discussed
and comments are provided within the context of the assumptions made by their authors;
t he prim ary differentiation between the existing schemes can be made based on t he as-
sumption of an off-line and/or on-line trusted authority. Although the main cont ribution
of this thesis is a peer-to-peer key man agement scheme for fully self-organized MANETs,
the discussions on the exist ing schemes are also applicable to schemes that assume t he
existence of an off-line and/or on- line trusted third party.
Before int roducing the different prot ocol groups, it is necessar y to clarify what is mean t
by key management. The subsequent section also provid es definitions and te rm inology for
the different properti es and requirements of key man agement schemes.
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3.1.1 Defining Key Management
A keying relationship is the state wherein network nodes sha re keying material for use
in cryptographic mechan isms [41]. The keying material can include public/private key
pairs , secret keys, initialization parameters and non-secret parameters supporting key
man agement in vari ous instances. Key management can be defined as a set of techniques
and procedures supporting the establishment ami maintenan ce of keyin g rel ationships
between aut horized parties [41]. In summar y, key management integrates techniques and
procedures to establish a servi ce support ing [41]:
1. Ini t ializati on of system users within network.
2. Generation, distribution and installation of keying material.
3. Control over the use of keying material.
4. Update, revocation and destructi on of keyin g material.
5. Storage, backup/recovery and archival of keyin g material.
G. Bootstrapping and maintenance of trust in keying material.
Authentication is the basis of any secure communicat ion. Wi thout a robust authent ica t ion
mechanism in place the remaining secur ity goals (see Section-2.3.1) are in most instances
not achievable. Authentication can only be realized by means of verifying something known
to be associate d with an identi ty. In the electronic domain the owner of the identi ty must
have a publicly ver ifiab le secret associated with its identi ty, ot herwise, the node can be
impersonated.
Authent icat ion in general depend s on the context of usage [41]. Key man agement is
concerned with the authent icity of the identities associate d with the six services given
above; it is a concept which may seem trivial at first , bu t one that is not easily achieved .
Authent icat ion of users is par ti cularly difficult (and in most network set tings impossibl e)
wit hout the help of a trusted authority.
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T he fund am ental funct ion of key management schemes is the establishment of keying
material. K e:1J es tablishment can be subdivided into key agreement and key t ransport [41].
J{ey agreem en t allows two or more parti es to derive shared keying mat erial as a fun ct ion
of information cont ributed by, or associated with , each of the protocol par ti cipant s, such
that no party can pre-det ermine the resul t ing value [41]. In key transport protocols, one
party creates or otherwise obt ains keyin g material , and securely t ransfers it to the other
par ty or part ies [41]. Bot h key agreement and key t ransport can be achieved using eit her
symmetr ic or asymmetric techniques . A hybr'id key establishment scheme makes use of
both symmet ric and asymmetric techniques in an at tempt to exploit t he advantages of
bo th tec hniques [41].
3.1.2 Requirements of Key Management Schemes
Key man agement services should adhere to the following gene ric secur ity attributes:
Confidentiality: Key management schemes should guarantee key secrecy, i.e. ensure the
inabili ty of adversaries or un au thorized par ties to learn (even par ti al) key mat erial.
K ey Authentication: Key authentication is a prop erty whereby a communicat ion ent ity
is assure d that only the specifically intended and authent icated communication ent ity
may gain access to the cry ptographic key material.
Key authent ication, in the context of a communication session between two par-
ties, can either be unilatera l or m utual : unilateral authent ication means that only
one par ty 's keying material is aut hent ica te d, while mut ual authent icat ion involves
validating both parties ' keyin g material.
Possession of the key is in fact independ ent of key authent icat ion . Key aut hent ica-
tion , without knowledge that the intended recipient actua lly has the relevant key, is
referred to as implicit key authent ication.
K ey Confirmation: If key confirmat ion is provided by a key est ablishment protocol,
communicat ion ent it ies prove possession of authent icated keyin g mat erial. Key au-
thent ication wit h key coufirmation yields explicit key authent ication.
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K ey Freshness: The key freshness property improves security by ensur ing new and in-
dependent keys between different communication sessions. By separating communi-
cat ion sessions, t he available inform ati on for crypt ana lyt ic purposes is limited , which
makes cryptanalyt ic at tack more difficult.
P erfect Forward Secrecy: Perf ect forward secrecy (P FS) ensure s that compromise of
long-term keys cannot resu lt in compromise of past session keys [46] [61] [41].
R esistant to Known Key Attacks: A kcy man agement scheme is vulnerable to kno wn
key att acks (KKA) if a compromised past session key or subset of past session keys
allows [46] [61] [41]: 1) A passive adversary to compromise future session keys and
2) An act ive adversar y to impersonate other protocol participants.
Forward Secrecy: A key management scheme with a forward secrecy property pr events
an adversary from discovering subsequent keys from a compromised cont iguous sub-
set of old keys [62] [63].
Backward Secrecy: A key management scheme with a backward secrecy property pre-
vents an adversary from discovering preceding keys from a compromised cont iguous
subset of old keys [62] [63] .
Key Independence: Key independence guarant ees that a passive adversary who knows
a proper subset of keys cannot discover any other keys [62] [63] .
A vailability: A high availability feat ure prevents degradation of key managcmcnt ser-
vices and ensures that keying material is provided to nodes in t he network when
expected .
Survivability: Survivab ility is the capability of the key management service to remain
available even in the presence of threats and fai lures, Survivab ility goes beyond
secur ity and fault tolera nce to focus on the delivery of services, even when the
syste m is partly compromised or experiences failures , Rapid recovery of services is
required when condit ions improve [64]. Survivability includes byzantin e robustness
which imp lies that the key management serv ice should be able to fun cti on properly
even if some misb ehaving participat ing nodes at te mpt to disrup t it s operati on .
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More specifically, key man agement services with a survivability feat ur e focus on the
delivery of essent ial services (for example cert ificat ion services ill public key infra-
structure) and the preservation of keying material (pub lic key cert ificates , session
keys etc .). Survivability call be summarized by the The Thr-ee Rs [64]:
• Resistance: The capability of the sys tem to defend against or to lerate attacks.
• Recognition: The capability of the system to detect at t acks in pro cess and
monitor the extent of the dam age or compromise.
• R ecoueru: Recovery is the main feature of survivabili ty. It is t he capability to
maintain servi ces dur ing attack, limit the exte nt of the damage and restore full
services following t he attack.
R ob u st n ess: The key man agement scheme should accommodate hardware and software
failure s, asymmetric and un idirectional links and network fragmentati on/ part it ioning
due to limited / error-prone wireless connect ivity [64].
Efficiency: The key man agement serv ice should be efficient with respect to communica-
tion , computat ional, memory and energy resources.
Scalab ility: Scalabi lity ensure s efficiency as the number of networking nod es rapidly and
significant ly cha nges. T he key management scheme should thus seamlcssly scale to
network size.
3. 2 Key M anagement In Mobile Ad Hoc N etworks
The main focus of this chapte r is to provide a detailed account of the exist ing peer- to-
peer key man agement schemes for mob ile ad hoc networks (MANET s). Investigati on by
the author within t he available publications has led to t he classificat ion of t he current
pro tocols into t he following subset s:
1. P artially dist ributed certificate authority.
2. Fully distributed certificate aut hority.
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3. Identity-b ased key man agement.
4. Cert ificate cha ining based key man agement .
fl . Cluste r-based key management.
6. Mobili ty-based key man agement.
7. P arallel key man agement .
Most of the above subsets use public key cryptography due to its super iority in dis-
t ributing keys, providing authent icat ion and in achieving int egrity and non-r epudiation
[1] [41]. Symmet ric key syste ms need a channel tha t provides both dat a int egrity and
confidentiality: the latter property may not always be readil y available without any form
of t ruste d aut hority or secure side channel (such as an infrared interface).
The pa.rtially distributer! cer ti ficate auihorits] group of pro to cols distribute the trust in the
cert ificate aut hority to a subset of the network communicat ion ent it ies . The approach
mitigates the single point of vuln erability inherent in the centralize d certificate authority.
P rotocols considered to repr esent t his impl ement ati on method are presented in [1] and [65]
resp ectively (Section-3.3).
The f ully dist ribut ed certifica te authority protocol subset preserves the symmetric relation-
ships between t he communicat ion ent it ies in MANETs by distributing the burden of key
man agement to all communicat ion entitie s. Each authorized node in the network receives
a share of the certificate authority 's secret key allowing neighbors to service requ est s for
cert ification. The protocol that introduced this method is presented in [2] (Sect ion-3.4).
T he id entity-based key managem ent approach borrows concepts from the partially dis-
iri lnited cert ifi cate auihoriti: protocols, bu t uses an identi ty-Lased cryptosystem to redu ce
t he storage requirement compared to convent iona l public key cryptosystems. The protocol
by [66] will be considered as represent ative of this protocol group (Section-3.5).
In the certificate chaining based key m anag em ent approach communicat ion ent it ies can
authent icate cert ificates by means of findin g cert ificate chains between them. Certificate
chaining can be explained by the following example: par ty A wants to communicate with
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par ty C , which requires party A to authent icate party C 's certificate. The two parties
have no communication history, bu t party A trusts the certificate of a third ent ity, party
B . Party B informs party A that it trusts the cert ificate of party C. Party A which trusts
party B will t hus also t rust par ty C as a result of par ty B's recommend ation. There is thus
a fully connected cert ificate chain between party A and C through party B which enables
party A to authent icate the certificate of par ty C without any previous communication.
Section-3 .6 investigates the protocol tha t introduced the cert ificate chaining based key
management approach as detailed in [07] [3].
The clust er-based key managem ent subset relies on a clustering algorithm to subdivide the
network into smaller groups. Group members in the same proximity can monitor their
neighbors and make recommend ati ons to memb ers from other groups on the aut hent icity
of their neighbors' certificat es. The cluster-based subset is introduced by investigating the
pro tocol presented in [4] (Sect ion-3.7).
The mo bility-based key managem ent subset exploits mobili ty and nod e encounters to es-
tablish securi ty assoc iations and warrant mutual authenticat ion between nodes. In con-
t rast to the previously discussed subsets, the protocols in this group introduce a shift
in paradi gm with respect to previous attempts to provide key management for MANETs.
Rather than trying to ada pt solut ions suited for convent ional wireline networks, the proto-
cols in this subset use the unique characteristics of MANETs to their advant age. Section-
3.8 investigat es the symmetric and asymmetric key based protocols that introduced the
mobility-based key management approach as presented in [68J [5].
The combina t ion of any of the above key management approaches gives rise to what
the author calls the parallel key managem ent subset. By integrating two of the above
approaches in parallel, the advantages of t he one scheme is used to mitigate the disadvan-
tages of the ot her. This subset can be represente d by t he scheme introduced in [6], which
combines a par ti ally distributed certificat e aut hority [65J and t he cert ificate chaining based
key man agement approach [3] (Sect ion-Sjl) .
28
Chapte r-S. A Survey on Peer-ta-Peer Key Ma nagement for Mob ile Ad Hoc Net wor ks
Server I Server 2 Server n
Figure 3.1: Key management service J</k configurat ion [1]
In
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Figure 3.2: Threshold signa ture K [k generation [1]
3.3 Partially Distributed Certificate Authority Approaches
One of the first approaches to solve the key man agement problem in MANETs was pub-
lished in [1]. This approach was later extended in [69] [70] [71] and [65] . Schemes ar e
st ill act ively proposed wit hin t his subset [72] [73] [74] . T he authors of [1] proposed a
distributed pub lic key management service for asynchronous ad hoc networks , where t he
trust is distributed between a set of nodes by let t ing the nodes share t he system secret .
The distributed cert ificate authority (DCA), illust rated in F igure-3.1 [1], consists of n
server nodes which, as a whole, have a public/private key pair J( / k. The public key J(
is known to all nodes in the network , whereas the privat e key k is divided into n shares
(S l' S2, S3 , . . . , sn), one for each server.
The distributed cert ificate authority (DCA) signs a certificate by producing a threshold
group sign ature as shown in Figure-3.2 [1]. Each server generates a partial signa ture using
its private key share and submits the par ti al signa t ure t o a combiner C. The combiner
can be any server and requires at least t + 1 shares to successfully reconstruct the digit al
signat ure .
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3.3.1 System Analysis
3.3.1.1 Initialization Phase
The syste m as proposed in [1] requires an off-line t ruste d t hird party (TTP ) to const ruct
the distributed public key management service. P rior to network formation t he TTP
uses a threshold secret sharing scheme [75] to generate shares (81,82,83, ... : 8 11 ) of t he
DCA 's privat e key k , These shares are distributed to n. arbitrary nod es (servers ] which
collectively form the DCA. The TTP must also issue all nodes in the network with t he
DCA 's authentic publi c key K.
3.3.1.2 Certificate Retrieval
Nodes that require a certificate have to successfully contact at least t + l out of the n DCA
servers . As illustrated in Figure-3.2, the threshold signature scheme pr oposed in [1] makes
use of a combiner node C to combine the par ti al digit al signatures from t he t + 1 servers .
Any nod e can be chosen as a combiner, since no ext ra inform ation about the private key
k is disclosed to C. It is always possible for a combiner node to be compromised by an
adversary or to be unavailab le due to battery depletion or poor connectivity. As a solution
the authors of [1] proposed select ing t + 1 nodes as combiners to ensure that at least one
combiner can successfully reconstruct the digit al signat ure . All nod es in the network ,
including the combiners, can verify the validi ty of the signature by using the CA public
key, K.
The proposal pr esented in [ti9] [70] [ti5] differs from the original proposal in [1]' since the
threshold signature scheme of Yi and Kr avets does not require a combiner node C to
construct the group signature . In [69J [70J [65J t he DCA is called a MObile Certificate
Aut hority (MOCA). In the MO CA framework the communication pattern is one-to-many
and visa versa, which means that a node that requires certificate services needs to contact
at least t + 1 MOCA nodes and receive replies from each of t hem. T he combin ing of the
partial signatures is thus performed by the node requesting certificat ion.
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T he original proposal in [1] does not specify a communicat ion pro tocol (cert ificate re-
trieval mechanism ) for a node to cont act the key management service. The proposal
in [69] [70] [65] focuses primarily on the one-to-many-to-one communicat ion pat tern be-
tween a node and the MOCA. The MO CA certificat ion protocol allows a node requiring
cert ification services t o broadcasts certification request (CREQ) packet s. Any MO CA
node that receives t he CREQ packet answers with a certijicatioti Tcply (CREP) cont ain-
ing its par ti al signat ure on the cert ificate . If t he node successfully receives t + 1 valid
CREPs in a fixed period of time, it can reconstruct the full cert ificate. If the cert ificate
is verified to be correct , the cert ificat ion request has succeeded. If the number of CREPs
is insufficient afte r expiry of the node's CREQ timer , the pro cess fails and the node can
init iate another request . CREQ and CREP are similar to the route request (RREQ) and
mute r'eply (RREP ) of on-demand ad hoc rou t ing protocols (for example AODV [33] and
DSR [76]). As CREQ packets are routed t hrough nod es, a reverse path is established back
to the sender. The reverse path is coupled wit h t imers and main t ained for a fixed t ime
period to allow ret urning CREP packets to travel back to the node request ing t he cer-
tificate service. In this case an on-demand routing protocol and the MO CA cert ificat ion
protocol can benefit from each ot her by sharing rou ting informat ion [65].
Flooding : In the first impl ement ation of the MOCA certification protocol presented in [6U],
flooding is used for reliable dat a disseminat ion. As shown in simulation results presented
in [6U], the flooding technique yields an effect ive approach to contact at least t + 1 servers ,
but generates a high communicat ion overhead. To prevent the potenti al broadcast st orm
nature of flooding, bro adcast IDs are used (similar to [33]) such that all the CREQ
generate d by the same request are t agged with t he same I D in order to allow int ermedi at e
nodes to drop requests that have already been forwarded.
(3- Unicast: To redu ce t he amount of certificat ion traffic from flooding while keeping an
accept able level of service, the method of {J-unicast is introdu ced in the second report on
t he MO CA service [70]. The method relies on multiple unicasts instead of floodi ng, using
sufficient cached rou ting tabl e informat ion. The invest igat ions in [6U] show that a nod e
client caches a moderate number of routes to IvIOCA nodes under reasonable certification
traffic in the network. T he parameter {J represents a sufficient number of cached rou tes
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requ ired by a node to use unicast instead of flooding. Flooding is t hus the default method
for cont act ing the MaCA in case the node fails to accumulate enough information in it s
cached routing tables. If t he node perceives t he network to be stable with relatively low
mobili ty, t + 1 cached routes may be sufficient to initi ate a mul tiple unicast CRE Qs . To
guarantee a reply from at least t + 1 servers the authors in [70] introduce safety margin a .
In the case of inst ability the nodes should send out an addit iona l a CREQ to increase t he
probab ility of successfully reaching t + 1 servers. The sum of a and the crypto threshold
t. is called t he uni cast threshold and represe nte d by (J . If t here are more than sufficient
(13) routes in the node's local cache, then the choice of which routes to use will affect
pe rformance. Thr ee schemes are suggested in [70]:
• Ran dom MO CA nodes: A random number 13 of Ma CA nodes in the routing t able
are select ed.
• Closes t MOCA nodes: By utilizing the readily available hop count informat ion in
the rout ing t ab le, {3 MaCA nodes with the minimum hop count are chosen.
• Freshest MO CA nodes: T he most recent ly added 13 rout es are used for f3-unicast .
3.3.1.3 Certificate R evocation
Cert ificate revocati on is not given much at te nt ion in [1] [69] [70] or [65]. T he aut hors
propose a simple cer tification list (CRL) approach. In the MaCA framework t + 1 nodes
must agree to revoke a certificate . Each MaCA node generates a revocati on certifica te
that contains informat ion of the cer tificate to revoke. The MaCA node then broadcas ts
it s partially signed revocat ion certi ficate across the network. Nodes that received t + 1
par tial cer t ificates will reconstruct the revocation cer tificate and update their local CRL.
3 .3.1.4 C ertificate R enewal
Expired cert ificates can be renewed by sending a CREQ message to any t + 1 MaCA
nodes. E ach MaCA node will up dat e tho cert ificate contents with relevant information
32
Chap te r-S. A Sur vey on Peer-to-Peer Key Man agement. for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
(for example wit h a new expiry t ime) and newly bind t he public key to the nod es ident ity
by generat ing a partial signature.
3.3.1.5 Share Update
The key management services in [1] [65] employ proactive key share refreshing [77] to
t hwart mobile adversari es and adapt to changes in t he network. An adversary attempt ing
to break t he syste m mu st compromise more t han the t hreshold t servers within t he t ime
interval between key updates.
3.3.2 Discussion on the Partially Distributed Certificate Authority Ap-
proaches
One of the advantages of the distributed certificate authority proposals is that they addres s
the lack of server infrast ructure in MANETs by dist ribut ing t he fun cti onali ty of a central
author ity among a group of users. The par tly dist ributed system offers secur ity services
with a higher availability feature than a cent ralized server approach. The scheme however ,
does not have a cert ificate revocat ion or synchronizat ion mechanism to update servers .
T he solution present ed in [1] has remnan ts of it s wired predecessors, namely a t rusted
author ity, sp ecialized server and combiner nod es. T he Ma CA framework prop osed in [65],
in contrast to t he or igin al DCA proposal [1], does not require a combiner server, C ,
effect ively solving t he problem of ensur ing t he availability of C.
The solut ion still has a largely centralized approach, altho ugh t he t hres hold scheme allows
t DCA servers to be compromised wit hout sacrificing t he key management service. One
of t he maj or assumptions of t he solut ions proposed in [1] [65] is t he presence of an off-
lin e TTP t hat initi ally empowers servers or distributes keyin g material before network
formation . The info rmat ion distributed by the off-line T T P makes t he solut ion non-
scalable since all network certificates mu st he known a prio ri by t he DCA servers in ord er
to provide access control to certificat ion ser vices . The assumption of an off-line TTP also
m akes t he scheme unsuit ab le for fully self-organized MANETs.
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The communicat ion overhead introduced by [1] [65] is a point of concern as nodes need
to contact the DCA every t ime t hey require certificat ion . Any node can contact t he
D CA by flooding t he network with a cert ificat ion request . The flooding method is an
effect ive way to contact t out of n D CA nodes [65]. The problem is t hat ea ch of t he
D C A nodes resp onds with a certificat ion reply causing a reverse packet storming effect of
O (n) [65] . Yi et al [65] make a noteworthy effort to optimize t he scheme by investigating
differ ent dat a dissemination techniques for contacting t he DCA by means of simulation .
In anot her paper, [78], the authors of [oS], investi gate uuuuicast whi ch appears to be a
promising technique to contact only a subset of members from a gro up with minimum
communication overhead. Mu usicast yields bet t er perfor mance t han t he flooding and {3-
unicast t echniques discussed in Section-3.3.1 espec ially if manycast is int egrated into t he
ro uting protocol.
Analysis by t he author on t hese schemes have shown that t hey are subject to the followin g
weaknesses:
• The distribution of t he system 's private key is normally performed with a t hreshold
secre t sh aring scheme [7fi]. Central to t he security of t he t hreshold cry ptosyste rn is
the choice of t he security parameters (n , t ), where n is the total number of nod es
forming t he DCA and t , t he t hreshold of nod es t hat must be compromised to render
t he system insecure. The process of choosing appropriate par ameters (n, t ) is a very
difficult t ask. The choice of these paramet ers inevitably for ces a trade-off between
t he security of t he system and t he availability of t he D CA nodes.
Some of t he fact ors to consider when choo sing (n, t) are : the networking enviro n-
ment of the MANET; physical security of the users ' nodes; bandwidth require-
ment/ utilization of t he users; freque ncy of certification request s to the D CA; mo-
bili ty pattern s of users; capabilities of attackers and ; t he availability of t he D C A
nod es. For example, MANETs are subject to error-prone wir eless connectivity, limi-
te d energy resources (po or bat t ery life) and limi t ed transmission ranges (see Section-
2.1). Nodes forming t he D CA may t hus frequ ently be un available for t he rendering
of cert ificat ion services. A hostil e environment , such as those found in military ap-
plicati ons , would require t to be set as high as possibl e. The problem however is t hat
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increasing t up to a "safe" point may prevent users from successfully contact ing t out
of 'II. D C A nod es . The fundam ent al observation is that taking all t hese fact ors into
consideration when choosing ('11. , t) , while keeping in mind the secur ity/availability
trade-off, is a difficult problem to solve and is central to the security provided by
thres hold cry ptosystems. In the view of the author , a st rong secur ity argument is
not possibl e with this approach.
• In thres hold cry ptosys te ms it is impracti cal to assume that a m obile adversar y cannot
compromise more than t sh areholders during the entire lifetime of the system [1] [77]
[2]. This forces the nod es forming the DCA to execute a share renewal protocol
[77] within a variable period T ; the choice of T is influenced by similar fact ors to
those that affect t he selection of ('11. , t ). The share renewal pr otocol has to be fully
distributed as the DCA members have no access to a cent ral on-line TTP.
• The ini ti al access st ructure r}~ , t ) of the shar e distribution sche me will not rem ain
const ant [79]. Assumi ng t he same shareholders to be present at all t imes are unrea-
listi c and the secur ity/availability t rade-off will also have to be altered (by reselecting
('11. , t) on the fly) as a fun ction of system vulnerability, changing networking environ-
ment and cur rent fun ction ality of t he cryptosystem . Users may randoml y join or
leave t he DC A gro up, hence the DCA will exhibit dynamic group membership as
associated with dyn amic peer groups [46]. The secur ity par am eter ('11., t) will have to
be adjuste d to allow for th e dyn am ic membership. This obligate s the DCA nodes
to exec ute a secret redist ributio n protocol [79] [80] in order to distribut e the shar es
to a new access structur e r~' ,t' ) on each membership change or secur ity/availability
trade-off adjustment .
• An alysis by the aut hor has shown that the overhead associate d with fully distributed
secret update and secret redistribution proto cols may not be practi cal in MANETs.
The author's studies on exist ing, fully distributed secret update and secret redis tri-
bution protocols [80] [77] [79], have shown that distributed sh ar e updatc/rekcying
schemes have a high communicat ion and computational cost , which will have to be
exec uted more frequently ill MAN ETs than expected. To pu t t he overhead in more
quantitative te rms, share updating requires O(n +t) messages from each D CA mem-
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ber , while each DC A member performs O(nt) exponent iations and generates O(t)
random numbers. The share renewal protocol has similar overhead with O(n' + t')
messages for each DC A memb er and O(n't ') exponentiations and O(t' ) random num-
. (n',k')
hers generated by each memb er of the new access st ructure I'p' . The network as
a whole has a communication cost of 0(n2 + nt) and 0(n,2+ n't ') for secret up dat e
and redist ribution resp ectively. In the ana lysis of t he schemes a synchronous bro ad-
cast system was assumed. It is genera lly agreed that network wide synchronization
is not easily achievab le in MANETs. Wi thout a synchro nous broadcast system it is
not clear if fully dist ributed secret upd ate and redistribution protocols are possibl e
while defending against all t he known attacks [81] [82].
To the best of t he author 's knowledge there is cur rent ly no secret sharing, secret
update and secret redistribu tion schemes available that are suitable for MANETs.
• Nodes in MANETs have a symmetric relationship, hence nodes are all equal and
therefore should fairly share or equa lly distribu te t he resp onsibili ty of providing all
network functi ons. This is not only important for security reasons , but to ena ble the
network to ensure reliable and availab le services that places the same burden on the
computationa l, memory and energy resour ces of all the network par ticipants. The
use of a DCA as on-line TTP violates the symmetric relationship between network
nodes. When t he DCA is formed by all the nodes in the network , as in [2], the
sym metric relati onship is preserved . T his however imp airs t he overall secur ity of the
system since an attacker can compromise any t nodes in the ent ire network to break
t he threshold cryptosystem (see Sect ion-3.4) .
If there exists het erogen eity among network par ticipants, the use of nodes with more
advanced resources for t he DC A nodes is not only unfair , but promotes selfishness
or denial of service attacks . Unequally shared responsibility is also fundamentally
against t he notion of fully distributed systems and motivates localized are as of vul-
nerability. It is however noted that the not ion of heterogeneity can be exploited
in network settings where t he no des do not have symmetric re lationships, such as
those found in mili t ar y type networks [65]. In such a scena rio the bur dened nodes
will to lerate the exploitation for t he benefit - or "survival" of the network as a whole.
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• Another issue that has also been sur prisingly overlooked is how the memb ers of
the DCA will collaborate to sign certificates . This is a more difficul t problem than
one may t hink: designing group signa tures is mu ch more complex than single party
signatures. What is needed by the distributed auihori is; based schemes proposed
in [1] [65J [2] is a threshold-multisign ature scheme [83] [84] [85] [86]. Th reshold-
tnultisiqnaiure schemes can be differenti at ed from t hres hold g1'OUp signature schemes
[87J by t he fact that , by definition in the lat ter , t he indi vidual signers remain anony-
mous. In threshold g1'OUp signature schemes it is computat ionally difficult t o derive
the identi ti es from t he group signature with the except ion of t he group man ager( s).
In cont rast, in ihres liold-tnultisiqtuiiure schemes, the individual signers are publicly
traceable and do not enjoy anonymity. Consequent ly, t he t raceability property of
threshold-rnult isignature schemes allows t he individual signers to be held accounta-
ble in t he public domain . The author be lieves traceability of the individual sign-
ers is essent ial in MANETs. The current state of t he art threshold multisign ature
schemes [83] [84] [85] [86] are notoriously flawed [88] [89] [90] [91J . What is even
more discouraging is that all t he existi ng group signature schemes that have been
proposed to dat e are for conventiona l networks. It is widely known t hat solutions
suitable for MANETs, in most cases, require a shift in par adi gm in order to miti gat e
the consequences of t he unique characteristics of MANETs.
• T he exist ing soluti on in t he pa1'tiall y distribu ted certifica te authority subset does not
aim to br eak t he routing-security interdepend ency cycle [92].
3.4 Fully Distributed Certificate Authority Approaches
In [93J [2], a pu blic key management solut ion is prop osed based on the approach originally
presented in [IJ. Their solut ion also uses an (n, k)l t hreshold signature scheme to form
a distrib uted certificate authority (DC A) . They enhance the availability feature of [I J by
choosing n. to be all t he nodes in the network. The privat e key S K of the DCA is thus
shared among all t he nodes in the network and enables a node req uiring t he service of the
1 In th is sec t ion k will uses, instead of t , for the threshold paramcn tnr no ta t ion to be compat ible wit h [2J.
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DCA to contact any k one-hop neighbor nodes. In contrast to [1], no different iation is m ad e
between serve r and client nod es with respect to certificat ion serv ices . T he solution includes
a sh are update mechanism to prevent more powerful adversaries from compromising the
cert ifica t ion service. On e of the lat est proposals within t he fully dis tributed subset can he
found in [94].
3.4.1 Syst em a n d Adversary M odel
The network mod el considers an ad hoc wireless network wit h insecure, error-prone and
bandwidth constrained communication cha nnels. T he network has no infrastructure and
a dynamically changing to po logy. The followin g assumptions are mad e:
1. Each node Vi has a unique identifier (ID ) and is able to discover its one-hop neigh-
bors.
2. Each node holds a valid certificate signed by t he DCA private key SK binding it s
I D to a public key PVi ' A cert ificate signed by S J( can be verified by t he aut hentic
public key of t he DCA P K.
3. One-hop commun ication is more reliable than mul ti-hop.
4. Each nod e has mor e than k one-hop neighbors at any t ime inst ance.
5. Detect ion of node misbehavior is eas ier and more practi cal among one-hop neighbors
in contrast to mul ti-hop nodes.
G. Mobility of the network is characterized by the spee d of the node with the highest
speed Smax'
The proposal in [2J [93J attempts to alleviate two types of attacks: deni al of service (DoS)
and adversary intrusion or nod e break-ins. Adversaries may issu e DoS attacks on vari ous
layers of t he network stack.
As defined in [77], adversaries can be characte rized by one of two models:
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Mo del I : During the ent ire network lifetime an adversary cannot successfully attack and
compromise more than k nodes.
Mod el II: If the network's lifetime is divided into t ime slots T , an adversary cannot suc-
cessfully attack and compromise more t han k nodes within T .
The aut hors of [2] [93] at te mpt to defend against Mod el II adversaries with a scalable
parallel share update mechanism.
3.4.2 System Analysis
3.4.2.1 Initialization Phase of Localized Certification Service
T he system as proposed in [2] [93] requires an off-linc t rusted third party (T T P) . The
RSA based design has a system DCA with an RSA key pair {Sf( , Pf(} . Prior to network
formation the TTP distributes a cert ificate signed with the DCA private key Sf( to each
node. The cert ificate is a binding between the nodes' unique ID and public key which may
be verified wit h the DCA's authentic pu blic key PK known by all nodes in t he network.
It should be clear that the localized cert ification service never creates or issues an initi al
certificate . It s funct ionali ty is the renewal of expired cert ificates or re-issuing of certificates
thought to be compromised by adversaries.
The off-line TTP distribu tes the first k shares. In more accur ate te rms , the TTP dis-
tributes to the first k nodes in the network a polynomial share Pv of the certificate signing
exponent SK according to a random polynomial f (:I:) such that P; = f(v) . Upon com-
plet ion of t his task the TTP has no further part in network opera t ion.
T he polynom ial f (x ) can be defined as: f (x ) = S f( +LJ~; !Jxj where il , [z , . . ., A- I
are uniforml y distribu ted over a finit e field F.
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3.4.2 .2 Localiz ed Self- in itialization
In [93], t he authors propose an algorithm used to distribute shares of 5f( to nodes joining
the network. A node joining the network must have a cert ificate binding its I D and public
key signed by 5 K, Only a joining node with a valid cert ificate, hence verifiable with P K ,
can obtain a share of 5 IC Since their architectur e is built on Shamir's thr eshold secret
sharing scheme [75], only a coalit ion of k: nodes can issue the uniniti alizcd nod e with a
share of 5 IC
T he self initialization protocol can be summarized in four steps :
1. A joining node broadcasts to neighb oring nodes a service request with addit iona l
local coalit ion information .
2. E ach neighbor (coalit ion memb er ) selects a nonce (random number ) for each other
node if its I D is lower t han t he ot her node 's I D . A complete shuffli ng schem e
is used by t he nodes to exchange these nonces between them. In the peer-to-p eer
exchange of nonces, t he nonces are negated by the node with the lower I D. The
nonces are encry pted with the pu blic key of the intended recipient coalit ion member.
3. The encrypt ed shuffling packets or nonces are then rout ed to coalit ion members.
4. Each of the coalit ion memb ers computes a shuffled par ti al secret share 55 from its
partial share P; in 5IC Since it is possible to derive 55 from Pv , 55 is blinded
to node Vx by adding the sum of all nonces to 55. Aft er decryp t ing the nonces
each coalit ion memb er computes 55' = 55 + L nonces and transmits its compute d
partial sh are 55' to Vx '
3.4.2 .3 C ertifica t e Issuing and R enewal
As described in the initializati on phase each nodc holds a share of the private key 5 K
according to the random polynomial f (x ). In [93J node Vi firstly locates a coalit ion {3 of
k neighbo rs {VI , . .. ,Vk } and bro adcasts certificat ion requests to the select ed neighbors.
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E ach node 'OJ E (3consults it s moni toring dat a and makes a decision to grant or refuse cer-
ti ficat ion. If Vi is certified as legit imate, 'OJ returns a par ti al cert ifica te Puj to t he requesting
nod e Vi . The nod e t hen recovers t he cert ificate as a whole fro m the partial certifica tes
using t he k-boiuuled coalition offset t ing algorit hm as given in [93]. This scheme remains
fun ction al even if coa lition members are under attack sin ce only k par tial signat ures are
require d from neighboring nod es.
In the later pap er [2] two drawbacks ar e identified with the approach in [93]:
1. If any of t he nod es 'OJ E (3 fail during the requ esting process, all t he ot her partial
certificates become useless.
2. When 'OJ receives a requ est from Vi the monitoring records may not provide sufficient
information to grant certificat ion . This will be the case in a network with high
mobility where Vj and Vi have never met before or have had insufficient int er action.
In order to solve t he first dr awb ack, dynamic coalescin g is introduced. This method
ste rns from the obs ervation that the coalit ion can be dyn amically formulat ed from any
res ponding nod es, instead of being specified a priori by the requesting node Vi . Fi gure-
3.3 [2] illu strat es how dyn amic coalescing might overco me the first problem identifi ed
above.
To solve the second drawback and accommodate mobility, cert ifica t ion is grante d if no
bad records are found. The un availability of records is t hus taken as insufficient reason to
deny certificat ion .
3.4.2.4 Certificate Revocation
Certificate records maint ained by node 'OJ consist of two compo nents: moni tor ed data
(certificates an d behavior ) of neighboring no des and a certificate revocat ion list (CRL) .
The CRL is a list containing user IDs and accusers . If a nod e 'OJ concludes by direct
data monitoring that a neighboring node is compro mised, it marks t he node "convicted"
in it s own CRL. The accuser 'OJ also flood s t he network with a signed acc usation against
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------. Local broadcas t ccrt request
- - - - ~ Responding partial cen unicast
F igure 3.3: Dynamic Coalescing [2]
the node. Now assume node Vj receives a signed accusation against an accused node, it
checks in the CRL if t he node has been previously marked "convicted" . If t his is t he case
the message is regarded as being a confirmat ion of the convict ion and dropped; if not ,
t he node is marked as "suspect" . To avoid the convict ion of legitimate nodes at least k
accusat ions against a node is required before it is marked "convicted" .
3.4.2 .5 P arallel Share Updates
For a share distribution system to be robust aga inst Model II adversaries, periodic up-
dates are required [77]. This prevents an at tacker from compromising more than k secret
shares in the period between periodic share updates . T he proposal in [93] gives two
approaches to achieve share updat es. The first approach is a pro cess based on t he loca-
lized self-init ializat ion explained in Sect ion-3.4 .2.2. The second approach features parallel
share up dates with faster convergence . The update is perfor med by dist ribu ti on of a
new random polyn omial f U P DAT E (x ) whose coefficients are encrypte d with Sf( to en-
sure authent icity. The node's new share in Sf( can then be collabora t ively evalua tecl as
P v(JP DAT E = f U P DAT E(v i) by k neighb oring nocles. Each neighbor returns their par ti al
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share update to Vi in a manner similar to that of the certification service. The par allel
share update approach t hus consist s of three st eps: collaborat ive generat ion of the update
polyn omi al f U P DAT E (X ) ; rob ust propagation of the updat e polynomi al 's coefficients and
distributed evaluat ion of share upd ates.
3.4.3 Discussion and Comments on Fully Distributed Certification Au-
thority Approaches
T he fully dist ributed cert ificate authority prop osal represents an improvement on t he
original partially distributed CA scheme in [1] by fairly dist ribu ting the bur den of holding
a share of the secret key between all nodes in the network . T his effect ively preserves
the symmetric relat ionship between network parti cipants. The availability of the key
management serv ice is increased as now any k nodes, in a local neighborhood , can renew
or issue a cert ificate. Nodes not in possession of a share can also cont act at least k nodes
to obtain a share.
Although innovative in design , the proposal suffers from most of the weaknesses discussed
in Secti on-3.3.2. As in the origina l proposal [1]' a trustworthy off-line aut hority must
issue every node before network formation with a certificate, bin ding a unique I D to a
pub lic key. T his requirement makes the proposal impracti cal for fully self-organized ad
hoc networks . Similar to [1] [65] this solution is ab o non-scalabl e since all identi ties must
be known a priori.
Since the numb er k is a trade-off between security and availab ility, the solut ion requires
a way of adjusting k as the network expands . As point ed out in [3] it is not clear how k
will be adjuste d in a network wit h a rapidly increasing or decreasing node density. T he
increase in avail abili ty of the certificat ion service also comes at the cost of secur ity since
a.ny k: nod es in the network can be compromised to break t he system; t he anthal' does not
believe that the assumption of a Model II adversary (Sect ion-3.4 .1) is realist ic if n spans
the ent ire network. For this reason k must always he chosen large enough to ensure the
secur ity of t he system
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The assumpt ion that each nod e will always have at least k one-hop neighbors is limiting:
uodcs may find. themselves with less than k neighbors more frequently than expecte d .
As in the case of [1] [65], it is not clear if this approach can break the routing-security
interdep endency cycle [92].
3.5 Identity-Based Key Management Approaches
I D-b &,>ed cryptography [95] [96] [97] origin at ed from t he need to reduce the memory
storage cost of public key encry ption keyin g mat erial and the burden of obtaining explicit
pub lic keys . Public keys in an I D-based scheme are nothing other than t he identities of t he
users themselves . T he identi ties, which are publicly known data, must uniquely identi fy
t he users . I D-b&,>ed schemes thus uniquely and privat ely bind secret keys to identiti es.
The identi ty-b ased signature schemes ar e normally spec ified by four randomized algorit hms
[96]:
1. Se tup: The setup algorit hm t akes as input a secur ity par ameter and returns a m ast er
public/private key pair K !'vI / kM for the system. The mas ter private key is only kn own
by t he t ru sted third par ty (T T P ) or private key generator (PKG) of the syste m.
2. Extract : T he extract algor it hm takes as input the master secret key and an identity
I D and returns t he person al secret key corresponding to t he I D.
3. Encrypt : The enc ry pt algor ithm ta kes as input t he maste r public key K M and t he
iden ti ty I D of the recipient and a message and returns the corresponding cipher text.
Note that J D serves as the public key of the recipient.
4. Decrypt: The dencrypt algor ithm takes as input t he mas ter public key, a ciphertext
and t he personal secret key and returns the original message encry pte d with the I D
corresponding to t he person al secret key,
T he personal secret keys in an identity-based cryptosysteni can also be seen as an im plicit
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symmetric key certificate, i.e. the persona l secret key is encry pted with the master secret
key of the PKG.
3.5.1 System Model
In [66], identi ty-based cry ptogr aphy [95] [96] is combined with threshold cryptography [41]
to avoid the extensive computational cost of pub lic key cry ptography. This solut ion is
similar to [1] with the t hreshold certificate authority replaced by a threshold privat e key
generator (P KG ). For this reason details of t he prop osal are not given and readers are
referred to [1] (Sect ion-3.3). In [66], a master public key (P IC) is generated by all users
on network format ion. When users want to encrypt messages, they use their identit ies
as t heir public keys and obtain their corresponding private keys by contacting at least t
out of n nodes wit h each share of their private keys encrypted by a share of t he master
private key (SJ( * ) . After decrypting each share with the master public key, combining all
t shares yields the privat e key corresponding to their identi ty.




On network formation, users agree on a key issuing policy and exchange all relevant
security parameters . These must be mutually acceptable and nodes not approving of t hese
parameters may choose to abort t he network format ion process. T he initi al set of nodes
t hen form a threshold private key generation servi ce (P KG) , which generates a master
public/secret key in a distributed manner. The master private key is thus distribu ted to
n nodes, each holding a share of Sf(* . An adversary with less than threshold t shares
cannot recover the master private key. The master pub lic key in turn is given to all joining
members of t he network.
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3.5.2.2 Registration Phase
After the initi alizati on phase the PKG can start issuing users wit h their private keys based
on their identity and the key issuing policy. The node contacts at least t of the nod es
forming the PKG, which each reply with their part of the requesting nod e's private key.
Up on receipt of t correct shares, the user can compute its private key.
3.5 .3 Discussion and Comments on Identity-Based Key Management
Approaches
In the initial phase of the proposed scheme [66], nodes decide on a mutual set of security
parameters. Any node that is not sat isfied with the choice of parameters can choose not t o
participate in t he network. T he authors of [66J state that their scheme is independent of
the initial negoti ations. T his independence is difficult to see as it is the responsibility of t he
key management protocol to successfully init ialize all system users wit hin a domain [41]
(see Section-3.1.1). If adversar ies are ab le to influence the select ion of system paramet ers
they will be able to force nod es not to participat e in the network.
The proposal does not address the issue of how the initial set of nodes will form the
PKG or how a nod e will obtain a pr ivate key from the distributed P KG . Dist ribution of
the master privat e key, as mentioned in [66], can be done using the algorithm presented
in [99J. Integrati on of the dist ribu ted key generat ion scheme [99] into the setup olqorit lun
of the identity-based signature scheme [97] will enable the generat ion of a distributed
master privat e key. A problem is not ed with the imp lement ation of extract algorithms
of exist ing iden ti ty-b ased signature schemes in distributed systems . It is noted that the
extract algorithms in [97J [96J [95J are designed for an ent ity obtaining a personal private
key from a centralized PKG. Any cent ra lized service in ad hoc networks is a single point
of vulnerability. T he extracting alqorithms will have to be mod ified for negot iati on of a
privat e key with a distributed PKG. See observations in Section-3.3.2 on secret sharing,
secret update, secret redistribu tion and threshold multisignature schemes.
The proposal does not avoid the weakn esses of I D-based cry ptography. T he major problem
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with I D-based cry ptographic schemes is that they yield only level 1 trust [100], i.e. the
private key of users is kn own by t he t ruste d author ity. In convent ional networks t his is not
so much of a problem , bu t in MANETs where the t rusted authority is distribut ed b etween
on- line servers or emulated by an arb itrary ujj~line ent ity, this may not be feasible.
Assume the node can negoti ate a personal private key with a distribut ed PKG; a maj or
problem is how t he P KG will secure ly transfer to t he requesting node its personal private
key shares. In t he scheme proposed in [66]1 t he requesting node shares no secret with t he
PKG, for example a common symmetric key, nor do the nodes have public/private key
pairs. It is therefore not clear how a node will obtain its personal key from the P KG in
the presence of an adversary. This problem can only be solved by set ting up some secure
channel or by pr e-distributing common keying material , neither of which is ideal in ad hoc
networks .
The proposal swaps one difficult problem for another. In the case of a PIG solution, the
pri mar y concern is the aut hent ication of public keys. In [66] t he problem is to authenticate
the identity of a node before sending the shares of the personal pri vat e key correspo nding
to t he ide nt ity.
T he solution is vulnerable to a men-in-the-middle attack on nodes joining the network [55].
Finally t his approach cannot break the rout ing-secur ity interdependency cycle [92].
3.6 Certificate Chaining Based Approaches
One of t he most recent proposals presented in [3J takes a step closer to meeting t he
cons traints of MANETs. Unlike previous solut ions, t he pu blic key infrastructure (P KI)
in t his proposal does not req uire any trusted third party. This makes t he scheme suit able
for fully self-organized MANETs . E ach node issues its own certi ficates to other nodes
in a manner similar to Pret ty Goo d Privacy (P GP) [101]. It differs from PGP in t he
fact. that. there are no centrally man aged certificate dir ectories (on-line certificate servers),
bu t certificates are rather stored and distributed by nodes in a self-organized nature.
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_ . _ . - Updated local repository of u (Gil)
.................... Updated local repository of v (Gv )
Certificate paths between u and v in
their merged updated local
repositories .
Figure 3.4: A certificate graph and certificate paths be tween users 1J, and 11 in their merged
updat ed local rep ositories [3]
Each node keeps a limi ted certificate reposit ory comprising of cert ificated nod es in it s
local neighb orhood. As illus trated in Figure-3.4 [3], when a nod e u wants t o validat e
the certifica te of anot her node v, the nodes combine their cer t ificate rep ositori es and u
attempts to find a chain of valid public key certificates between t hem .
3.6 .1 System Model
The authors of [3] pr esent their scheme in terms of an abstract mod el. In their model , the
public keys and the certificates of the system are represented as a directed certificate graph
G(V, E ), where V and E stand for the set of ver ti ces and t he set of edges, respectively
(Figure-3.4). The vertices of the certificate graph represent public keys and the edges
represent cert ificates . More pr ecisely, there is a dir ect ed edge from ver tex /(u to ver tex
/(w if there is a certificate signed with the pri vate key of "II. t hat binds /(w to an identity.
A cer tificate chain from a public key /(u to another public key K; is represented by a
directed path hom vertex /(u to vertex K; in G. Thus, t he existe nce of a cert ificate
chain from /(" to K; means that vertex K; is reachable from ver tex K" in G (denoted by
tc; --->c /(,,) .
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Step 0: Each user creates their own
public/private key pair KlPrK






_ . - Send (Gil uG,/) and request (G
X
! UG'IN)
Step 1: Issuing of public key certificates
(creation of the certificate graph G).
G/
~</~ ~ ~.......", 1 ~
................... updated local repository of II (G, )
Step 3a: Node II constructs its update
certificate repository from G uN .
Step 2: Certificate exchange with one-hop
neighbors.
G
................... updated local repository of II (G,)
_. - certification request
Step 3b: Node II constructs its updated
repository by communicating with other
nodes.
F igure 3.5: Four steps in ini t ial phase of certificate chaining proposal [3]
3.6.2 System Analysis
3.6.2.1 Initialization Phase
T he ini ti al phase of t he system is executed in four steps: each nod e creates a public/privat e
key pair ; each nod e creates a self-certificate , issues certificates to other nodes and con-
structs an nonupdated certificate graph; nod es exchange certificates; and create updated
cert ificat e rep osit ories. Each of t hese steps is illu st rat ed in Fi gure-3.5 [3] and explaine d in
more detail in t he sect ions t hat follow. Note t hat t he step numbering is kep t consiste nt
wit h t he numbering used in [3].
3.6.2.2 Step-O: Creation of Public/Private Key Pairs
Similar to PCP [101] users locally create their own privat e key and correspo nding publi c
key.
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3.6.2.3 Step-I: Creation of Self-certificates and Issuing of Public Key Cer-
tificates
Individual public key certificates are issued by the users themse lves with a limited validi ty
period. When a node 1/. has confidence in the public keyj ident ity binding of node v , node
u can issue a cert ificat e (recommendati on ) to vouch for the binding. The nodes use these
cert ificates to start const ructing a certificate graph G.
3 .6. 2 .4 Step-2: C ertificate Exchange
The certificate exchange mechanism allows users to sha re and distribute certificates in their
repositories. Certificates are stored at least twice: by the issuer of the certificate and by
the user to whom the cert ificate is issued . The certificate exchange process consists of t he
periodic exchange of cert ificates between nod es and their neighbors. Exchanges are asyn-
chronous. Users send their updated subgraphs G ll and nonupdat ed subgraphs G;j to their
neighbors , who use th e certificates to create or expand t heir nonupdated subgraphs. The
message contains only the hash-value of the certificates . The node checks the hash -values
against those held in its repositories and requests only t he cert ificates with a negative
hash-value compar ison. The certificate exchange pro cess has a low communicat ion cost
since cert ificate exchanges are only performed locally in a one hop fashion .
3. 6.2.5 St ep-3: C onstruction of Updat ed Cert ificate R epositories
The nonupdated repositories (subgraphs) provide the nodes with only an incomplet e view
of the certificate graph. An updated cert ificate repository is const ruct ed by node u by
select ing a subgraph Gll of G. This can be performed in two ways: nodes can use the sam e
local repository const ruct ion algorithm to explore only a relevant part of t he cert ificate
graph G (Step-3a, Figure-3.5) or const ruct an updat ed repository by communicat ing with
their certificate gra ph neighbors (Step-3b, Figure-3.5).
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3.6.2.6 Certificate Revocation
Users can revoke any issued cert ificate to other users in the instance of distrust in the
public key j ident ity binding. Simil arly users can also revoke their own cert ificate if they
beli eve that their private key has been compromised. The aut hors of [3] propose two
revocation schemes: explicit and implicit.
In the exp lici t: scheme t he user issues an explicit revocation message to nodes in its local
neighborhood. This will inevitabl y also be the users that usu ally request cert ificate s from
the revocation node under normal operation.
The implicit revocation scheme is based on the expirat ion time of the certificate s. The
scheme assumes that users will establish communicat ion within the validity period of the
certificate and exchange an updated version of the certificate .
3.6.3 Discussion on Certificate Chaining Based Approaches
The fully self-organiz ed key management scheme , presented in [67J [3], was the first to
give an indication th at key management , withou t any form of TTP, may be possible in
MANETs. T he self-organized scheme is clearly an advance on previous efforts [1J [65]
[2] [66] [4] to provid e key management for MANETs: eliminating any form of on-line
TTP eliminates most of the problems asso ciat ed with these schemes (sec Section-3 .3.2 for
a discussion on the distributed certificate authority proposals ). The fully self-organized
scheme presented in [67] [3] was designed for "open" MANETs and therefore not truly
comparable with the schemes that assume an off-line trusted aut hority.
In [67J [3J the authors address a very difficult problem . How does one explicitl y authen-
t icate t he public key of a user without any form of off-line or on-line trusted aut hority?
In MANETs this problem has to be solved with sporadic connect ivity, while optimizing
communicat ion and computatio na l resources. The problem can alt ernati vely be defined
in te rms of t rust estab lishment. If a user A t rusts the certificate of anot her user B, user
A has confidence that the public key contained in the certificate belongs to user B. User
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A and B therefore have a direct t rust relationship. Taking this notion a step fur ther , user
A can support the validity of the cert ificate of user B by signing the certificate with it s
own privat e key; any other user in the network that t rust s the cer tificate of user A will
also trust the certificate of user B if t hey are able to verify the recommendat ion of user
A, hence ver ify the signat ure . If user A also recommend s the cert ificates of ot her users,
a liierarcliical t rust model is create d. Certificate chaining used in PGP [101] naturally
evolves from a direct and hierar chical trust model combination .
The authors of [67] [~J successfully adapt the cert ificate chaining authent icat ion approach
to IvIANETs. The main difference between their scheme and P GP [101] is that the lat ter
sto res cert ificates in centralized repos itories. In [67J [3] the certificates are disseminated
and stored by all nodes without any assistance from a trust authority.
Trust relationships t ake t ime to form and require user inte raction. T he fu lly self-organized
scheme [67] [3] therefore introduces a delay in the setup of secur ity asso ciat ions . As a
result the solut ion may encounte r a problem in the initi al ph ase when t he number of
issued certificate s is insufficient to yield a sufficiently dense certificate graph .
Inherently a chain of trust provides weak aut hent ica t ion [102J [103]. A common assumpt ion
in most distribu ted authent ication pro to cols is that t rust is implicitly transit ive [103J.
Trust t ransit ivity means, for example, that if Alice t rusts Bob who trusts Clark then
Alice will also t rust Clar k. This has been shown to be genemll:lJ untrue [102]. Josang et
al define a valid transitive trust chain as a chain where every link in the chain contains
the same trust purpose [104J. Abdul-Rahman et al point out t hat valid transit ive t rust
chains satisfy four condit ions with reference to t he example above [103J. It is concluded
from [102] [103J [104] that it is very difficult to ensure valid tra nsit ive trust chains with
more that two links. T he author feels that users (in general) are not able to make intuiti ve
security related decisions. The public's lack of even the most basi c knowledge (such as wh at
is a public key cert ificate ) makes any scheme t hat relies on users reasoning about security,
vulnerable to at tack. Examples of schemes that avoid such "user reasoning" are prese nt ed
in [5] [105J [106J. In a two link t rust chain Alice has a direct trust relati onship with
Bob and relies on recommend ations from Bob based on this direct trust relat ionship. In
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pract ice a direct t rust relati onship implies t hat Alice and Bobknow each other personally.
This means that Alice can check wit h Bob if t hey share t he same t rust purpose or trust
condit ions. If t he chain is extended to three links (four users) then Alice will have an
indi rect trust relati onship wit h Clar k, hence may not know him personally. T he indirect
t rust relationshi p lessens Alice's ability to ensure that she and Clark have t he same trust
condit ions.
Futhermore, a chain is as st rong as it s weakest link . If any node along t he chain is
compromised or subject to byzantine behavior it may result in false authent icat ion . In
"open" or f ully self-organized networks this may be even more relevant than in "closed"
net works since an adversary does not have to compromise nodes to participate in the
cert ificate exchange mechanisms.
3.7 Cluster-Based Key Management Approaches
The key management scheme proposed in [4] originates fro m the certifica te chaining ap-
proach [3]. T he authors assume a cluster-base d network model const ructe d with the zonal
algorithm [107]. The zonal algor ithm for clustering ad hoc network s, partitions t he net-
work into different subsets usin g a distributed algorithm for findin g the minimum spanning
tree (MST ). Once the network is par ti tioned and the MST determined for each subset ,
t he algorit hm computes the weakly connecte d dominating set s of the regions. Finally, it
fixes the bord ers of the clusters, i.e. connects unj oined regions, by the inclusion of addi-
tio nal nodes in the sets. Nodes clustered toget her in the same region form a gTOUp and
are assigned a un ique I D. The nodes learn the group IDs of other nodes by exchanging
messages .
3.7.1 Trust Model
Each user is responsible for t he creation of their own public/private key pair and generat ion
of a self-cert ificate . Any node can sign the public key certificate of anot her node in the
same group upon request . Nodes are assumed to have some monitoring components
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Figure 3.6: Cluste r-based Trust Model [4]
t hat enable them to observe the nodes' behavior in t heir group and assign each nod e a
t rust value. The trust value is defined as an aut henticat ion metric, which represents t he
assur ance with which a requesti ng node s can obtain the corre ct public key of a target
node t. T he trust between nodes in the same group is referr ed to as direct trust . The tru st
relationship between nodes in different groups are referred to as recommendation trust .
T he t rust model is shown in Figure-3.G [4]. Each node should thus have a tru st table for
sto ring the t rus t values and relat ed public keys of nodes it knows in the network.
3.7.2 Public Key Certification and Trust Value Update
If a node s wants to obtain the publi c key certificate of some ot her nod e t, s performs t he
following pro cedure [4]:
1. Node s looks up the group I D of t, denoted as 'Pt .
2. Node s consults its t rust table and sorts the trust values of the nodes known to s in
group 'Pt· Let i I , . . . , in E I where in denotes the node with t he highest trust value.
3. Node s then sends cert ificatio n request messages to each node in subset I . These
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nodes are also referred to as the introducers.
4. Node s collects the reply messages m E M from I where m = {Pk" Vik ,t, . .. }Skik .
P k, denotes the public key of t, Vik,t denotes t he t rust value from ik to t . S kik
clenotes t he secret key of i» which is used to generate a signature on m .
G. Node s compares the public keys received from I and follows t he maj ority votes.
Let igood E I good and ibad E I bn.d, where I good are the nodes thought to be honest and
h ad t he remaining perceived dishonest nodes. Node s perceives the public key of t
received from I good to be authent ic.
6. T he trust valu es of the nodes E h ad are redu ced to zero . Node s t hen computes and
up dates the trust value of t using the following equation, where ik denotes the nod es
and n t he number of nodes in I good :
and
n




The public key certificat ion and trust value update pro cedures arc illustrated in Figure-
3.7 [4] and Fi gure-3.8 [4] respectively.
Step f may need some fur ther explana t ion. Aft er rece iving, decrypting and compar ing the
t rust valu es of I in step 5, s can calculate the new recommendati on t rust relationships
from s to t via the nodes in ik E I using Equation-3.1. Not e that t he nodes i bad E had
make no contribution since their trust values are red uced to zero. The 0 operator is
defined in [108J and is given as VI0 V2 = 1 - (1 - V2 ) VI . In [108], derivatives of t he
formula VI 0 V2 are used to compute new trust relati onships between VI and V
2
based
on the direct trust values and recommend at ion trust values between thorn. See [108] for
further det ails on the origin of VI 0 V2 .
Once Vs.ii"t 'if i kl has been computed, s can compute the ult imate t rust value \It of t as
seen by s after pubic key certification using Equation- 3.2.
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Figure 3.R: Trust Vallie Update [4]
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3.7.3 Discussion on Cluster-Based Key Management Approaches
This discussion will refrain from a det ailed evaluation of network clustering in MANETs,
but will rather focus on some issues related to the ana lysis of cluster-based key management
schemes .
• When MANETs scale, route calculations become increasingly expensive [107]. The
task of routing algor it hms may be simplified by confining route discovery t o a sub-
st ructur e of t he network. By introducing clust ering into the network local messages
can be t ransmitted on short paths within the same cluster , while long-distan ce mes-
sages travel longer dist ances from cluster to cluster. Each clust er is assigned a
clusterhead as represent ati ve of the cluster. The clusterhead takes on the res pon-
sibility of parti cipatingin inter-cluster route calculat ion and long-dis t an ce message
forwarding. The long-dist ance message forwarding requires t he clust erheads to use
more t ransmiss ion power , which will signi ficantly cont ribute to the depleti on of t he
node 's energy resources [9] .
• The dyn ami c nature of MANETs makes clust ering very problemati c. The main con-
cern is t he select ion , configurat ion, maintenance and replacement of clust erheads.
The role of a clust erhead should be able to be performed by any node in t he net-
work . Clusterheads are therefore no different from other nod es in MANETs and
thus exhibit some similar charact erist ics. Due to unreliabl e connectivity and route
failures , clusters may also partit ion. The frequent maintenan ce of clustcrheads and
cluste r membership is un avoidable and may t here fore cause impract ical computa-
tio na l and communicat ion overhead.
• The assignment of clusterheads is very difficult since nodes may not voluntarily t ake
on the resp onsibility [7] or necessarily have the required capacity t o accommodate
the addit ional overhead.
• The clusterheads become very convenient central points of attack for adversaries, for
example, an adversary which can est ablish itself as a clusterhead effectively controls
the whole cluster . Clearly t his will not work in fu lly self-organized MAN ETs.
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The authors of [4] simulate d t heir scheme in GloMoSim [109]. The 100 nodes in the
GUUm, x GUOm network were divided into 5 groups with vari ed mobility between 0 - lOmI~ .
The objective of the simulation was to test t he public key man agement scheme in t he
presence of malicious nodes. A percentage, m, of the nodes were set to he adversaries
and therefore always returned false public keys and t rust values. The scheme was not
implemented in parallel with a clustering algorithm bu t was divided into fixed groups . It
was thus assumed that the network clustering structure was already buil t. If the scheme
was to be impl emented on top of the clustering algorithm (for example the zonal algorit hm
[107]) it can be ant icipated that the simulat ion would produce significant ly different results.
Schemes should always be simulated in a realisti c setting , i.e. perfo rmance can only be
determined if the protocol under investigation is simulated together wit h the schemes
cent ral to its operation. T hese addit ional schemes in t um may consume addit ional network
reso urces which will certainly influence t he resul ts obtained from the simulations.
The cluste r-based key man agement scheme docs not alleviate the disadvantages of the
certificate chaining approach [3] (see Sect ion-3.6.3).
Key management schemes in MANETs should not rely on the functionality and correct
operation of ot her schemes. A cluster-based key management approach relies on the
effectiveness of a clustering scheme (for example t he scheme presented in [107]). At t acks
on the cluster ing protocol thus introduce addit ional vuln erabilities and may create an
indirect way of compromising the key management scheme and consequently the network 's
secur ity mechanisms as a whole.
3.8 Mobility-Based Key Management Approaches
In [68] [5], the aut hors propose mobili ty-assited key establishment schemes for MANETs.
As mentioned before, this author views these schemes as a significant advance in the state
of the art : in cont ras t to the previously discussed subsets, the pro to cols in [68] [5] intro-
du ce a shift in paradigm with respect to previous attempts to provide key ma nagement
for IvIAN ETs. Most of the existing key man agement schemes for MANETs t ry to mo-
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dify solutions suite d for convent ional wireline networks which may not always be ideal in
MANET:;. The proposals investi gated [(j8] [5] arc peer-to-peer key establishment schemes
that rely on user mobility to bring nodes within each ot her 's transmission range. This
allows them to exchange their keying mat erial without relying on a secure rou ting infra-
st ruct ure. This effectively breaks the rout ing-security interdepend ence cycle [92]. The
remainder of the sect ion focuses on the key agree ment techn iques proposed in [(j8] [5] for
fu lly self-organized l'vIANETs .
3.8.1 System Model
In [68] [5] the authors consider two models: a fully self-orga nized model and one with an
off-line trust ed authority. The lat t er , an authority based approac h will not be considered.
If a public key cryptosystcm is used , two users 1/. and v share a two-way secur ity association
if t hey exchange their triplets (U,klL , all) and (V, kll , all), where (U,lI) are the nam es of
users 1/. and'll, (ku, kv) arc their public keys and (au, au) their respecti ve node addresses .
In a symmetric key set ting the public keys are replaced by a shared key kill!
Users are equiped wit h wireless nodes wit h an integr ated side channel (such as an infr ared
interface) . The side cha nnel is used to set up secur ity associations when users physically
meet. in the network. This inherently constitutes visual authent icat ion by t he users and
allows users to bind user names to keying mat erial. The secur ity associat ion setup me-
chanism can be enhanced through t he use of [rierul nod es [5] .
To explain the key establishment mechanisms of [68] [5] in more det ail , t he establishment
of secur ity assoc iations in both a public key and symmetric key set t ing is considered.
59
Chap te r-S. A Survey on Peer- to-Peer Key Man agement. for Mobile Ad Hoc. Networks
3.8.2 System Analysis
3.8.2.1 Public Key Approaches
Fi gure-3.9 illust rates t he t hree main mechanisms for key est ablishment proposed in [68] [5].
The first [Mechanism (a)] allows users to est ablish a security association directly over t he
secure side channel during a physical encounte r . The side channel ensures dat a integrity
by eliminating the active adversary (see Section-2.3.2.3) . Coupling Mechanism (a ) with
key confirmat ion and a defence against replay attacks resul t s in Prot ocol 1 [68] [5] det ailed
below:
P rotocol 1 : Mechani sm (a)
msg l (secure side channel)





U --t v : au II [(u = h(1'u II U II tc; II au)]
v --t u : av II [(v = h(1'v II V II tc; II av)]
u --t v: 1'u II U II «; II au
v --t u : 1'v II V II tc; II av
u : h(1'v II V II tc; II av) = ( v?;V ?;m atch(K v, av)
v : h(1'u II U II «; II au) = (u?;U?;match( J(u, au)
u --t u: cr(1'v II U II V )
v --t u: cr (1'" II V II U)
In msg 1 and msg 2 the users exchange their network addresses (au,av) and the hash valu es
(( It, ( v ). E ach party computes a hash value by taking the hash h(·) of the conca tenation
(II) of t.heir random numbers (r'" , 1'v) and t riples [(U, K" , a,,), (V, Kv,av)] . They need each
ot her 's address in order to exchange keying ma terial on the radio interface in the following
roun ds . In msg 3 and 4, users exchange their t riplets and random numbers over the radio
interface. Each node checks (? ) whether the hash of the received ra ndom numbers and
triplet s over tho radio link match the received hash values rece ived over the side channel ,
i.e. h(1'u II U II K" II au) = (,,? and h(1'v II V II tc; II av) = (v? E ach user mus t also verify
that. the received user name corresp onds to the other par ty (U?, V ?) and that both nodes
can verify if t he received node address matches the received public key, i.e. match(Ku, au)
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--=-- exchange of keying material over secure
side channe l
- - - - - - - security association established directly over
secure side channe l
existing security association established
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one-way security association established via
friend
two-way security associa tion established via
friends
Figure 3.!J : Dir ect and friend-assisted security association establishment [5]
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and match(/(v, av). In the final two messages users send each other a signature (0"0 ) over
the radio link. Verifying the signatures with the received public keys serve as pro of that 'IJ,
and v knows t he corres ponding private keys. Note that the t riplets and signatures could
have been exchanged purely over the side channel, bu t Pro tocol 1 minimizes the amount
of data sent over the side channel by send ing hashes (~1L ' ~tI) as an integr ity check code
over the side channel. This allows 'IJ, and v to exchange t he rest of t he information over
the radi o int erface with the possibility of the man-in-the-middle at tack eliminated .
Mechani sm (b) uses a common friend f to generate and distribute to each node fresh
certificates . Since f shares keying material with both 'IJ, and v, t he user can verify the
rece ived certificates from f .
Mechanism (cl ) enhances key agreement during physical enco unters with friend security
associations and is simply a combination of Mechanism (a) and (b) det ailed above. This
mechanism can be used to establish eit her a one-way or two-way secur ity association
between u and v.
Mechanism (c2) will be discussed in the following section as it is more applicable in a
symmetric key setting .
3.8.2 .2 Symmetric Key A pproaches
In a symmetric key set ting the three mechanisms illustrat ed in Fi gure-3.g remain applicable
in a different context .
Wi th Mechanism (a) the users use the side channel to exchange all the necessary keyin g
material to set up a shared key between them. The side channe l in the symmetric key
setting must also provide confident iality in addit ion to data integrity (see Section-2.3.1) .
To avoid at t ack from passive adversaries the users must be cautioned to activate t heir side
channels with no ot her users within a "secure range" from t hem.
In Mechanism (b), users have a common friend f , that plays the role of a trusted authority
or trusted intermediatry. There are well established protocols that can be used in such a
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setup [41].
Mechani sm (c2) can be used if u and v do not share a common friend and in case they
do not want the trusted third party to know their shared key. A friend of u, named f
and a friend of v , named 9 are used as two separ at e paths by u and v to exchange key
cont ribut ions. P ro tocol 2 [68] [5] presented below explains Mechanism (c2) in more detail :
Protocol 2 : Mechanism (c2)
msg1 u -; v : i.r;
msg2 '0 -; u : g, rv
msg3 u. -; g: u; {du~g , request , v, k«,rv}kug
msg4 9 -; v : g, {dg~v , reply , u , ku, rv}kvg
msg3 ' '0 -; f : v , {dv~t- re que st, u , kv, ru}kvf
msg4' f -; u: f , {df~u , reply ,v, kv, ru}kuf
'/I., V: »; = h(ku II k:v)
In P rotocol 2 users u and v use messages 1 and 2 to exchange random numbers [ru, rv )
and the names (f,g) of their friends. In message 3 and 4 and message 3' and 4' , u.sends k«
to v via 9 and while v sends kv to u via f . All the messages are encrypt.ed wit h a shared
sym metric key kxy, where x E [u,v] and y E [g , i ']. In order t.o avoid ambiguity each
message includes t he dir ect.ion d and purpose of the message (request or reply ). Users u
and » generate a shared key kuv by t aking the hash of t he concatenati on of their individual
cont ribut ions.
3 .8 .3 Discu ss ion and Comments on Mobility-Based Key Management
Approaches
The main characterist ic of ad hoc networks is t he lack of infr astruct ure Nodes therefore
are resp onsible for all network functionality of which routing is the most import ant. In
st at ionar y ad hoc netwo rks , nodes may experience frequent link breakages as the t.raf-
fie in t he network increases. Node mobility significantly increases the frequency of t hese
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link breakages. This sporadic connect ivity results in a poor availability feature and a
high communicat ion overhead for key management schemes that rely on t he routing infra-
st ructure. Another reason why relying on the rout ing infr astructure is infeasible is t hat
any attack on the rou t ing protocol may render t he key management scheme insecure.
The rout ing-secur ity interdepend ence cycle [92] in eit her case forces the key management
scheme to be independent of the routing mechanism. Clear ly get t ing aro und this problem
requires a complet e shift with resp ect to the key management solut ions found in conven-
tiona l wireline network s. The fact that fully self-organized networks do not support any
form of trusted aut hority, not even duri ng off-line initializat ion , adds a new dim ension to
this problem . T he authors of [68] [5] det ach the key management scheme from the rout-
ing infrastructure by exploit ing user mobility. The mobi lity characte rist ic of MAN ETs,
which are widely regarded as a limiting factor , are turn ed around as an aid to the key
est ablishment mechanisms.
Dependence on mobility (t o bring users within a "secure range" in ord er t o use their secure
side channels) is t he maj or disadvant age of [68] [5]. The authors themselves identify t hat it
may t ake some ti me to set up a sufficient number of secur ity assoc iat ions. T heir simulati on
results show that , as intuit ively expected , the convergence t ime decreases with an increase
in user mobility. The pro posal will t hus find a st rong applicat ion as a complement ary
solut ion to other key management solut ions and is ideally suite d to est ablish secur ity
associations on the applicat ion layer in a self-organized sett ing [5].
3.9 Parallel Key Management Approaches
In [tij, t he aut hors propose a multiple key management approach by combining a dis-
tr ibute d certificate authority (Section-3.6) and certificate chaining (Sect ion-3.3) . The
proposal known as com posite key man agement is based on two fundamental principles.
Firstly, key management should be shared between mul tiple nodes and secondly a t rust ed
third par ty is required as an anchor of trust. Here certificates, as proposed in [3], ar c
st ored and dist rib uted by nodes in a self organized nature. [6] shows how a DCA can
be used in parallel with certificate chaining to elimina te some of the weakn esses of the
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certificate chaining approach . The approach increases availability of t he key man agement
service since nodes can use either serv ice to obtain keying material.
The remainder of the discussion on the proposals presented in [6] will focus on the modifi-
cations and addit ional mechanisms added to certificate cha ining and t he DCA approach .
3 .9 .1 System A nalysis
3.9.1. 1 M etrics of Authentica tion
By introducing auth ent ication m etrics (confidence values) an attempt is made to provide
users with a tool to calculate the level of trust t hat they can place in an inst ance of authen-
tication. Users thus assign a confidence value to certificates based on their relationship
with the certificate owner. In [6J the confidence value is also extended to incorporate t he
DCA as a t rusted t hird party.
3.9.1.2 Trust Model
In the certificate chaining approac h [3J users form a chain of trust by issuing certificates
to other nodes in the network with which they have some relati onship or have adequa te
reason to trust the binding between t he node's identi ty and public key. In [6], t he authors
illustrate t his concept by means of an example: if Alice trusts that Bob is t he holder of
a public/private pair , Alice issues a cert ificate cont aining Bob's I D , Bob 's public key and
ot her attr ibutes such as a cert ificate lifetime parameter. Alice then generates a digit al
signature on Bob 's certificate vouching for the certificate's aut hentic ity.
Similar to [3J, compos ite key management captures t rust relati onships between nod es in
a certificate graph where the edges represent a digital certificate and vertices public keys.
The edges are also coupled with a confidence value set by the certificate issuer and assigns
a level of t rust to t he issued certificate .
An example of a certificate chain is given in Figure-3.10 [6]. In the example, if Bob wants
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Tom/D.8 William/D.9 Charles/l.D Alice/D.8
Bob G--G ·@ •G) •GAliCe?
Fi gure s.io. Cert ificate chaining example [6]
to aut hent icate Alice, Bob needs to calculate a confidence valu e for the ent ire chain length.
This is done by firstly multiplying all the confidence valu es for each edge together to form
what is called a 10.111 confi dence uolue. To get the final confidence valu e, the chain length tl
and probability p of the nodes in the chain being compromised , must also be considere d.
The raw confidence valu e thus needs to be multiplied by an at tenuat ion factor (1 - IJ)d-l
whi ch yields the final confidence valu e for the chain as a whole. The user utilizes the final
confidence value to make a decision on whether to grant the authent icat ion or reject the
chain as a possible authent icat ion path.
3.9.1.3 Security Level of DCA
Where cert ificates in the cert ificat ion graph are assigned an aut hent icat ion metric, the
DCA is assigned a secur ity level (5L) reflecting the probability that an adversary can
compromise the DCA . The secur ity level is calcul at ed as follows:
5L = 1.0 _ G)
(~)
(3.3)
where n is t he number of server nodes in the CA, k t he crypto threshold, A1 the to tal
number of nodes in the network and c the number of nodes the mos t powerful advers ary
can compromise in a fixed time fram e.
A syst em model example is given in Figure-3.1l [6J showing the compositi on of cert ificat e
chaining and a DCA . The certificates are assigned authentication metrics and t he DCA a
secur ity level, as explained above.
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Figure 3.11 : Example system model showing DCA composed with I-hop Certificate Chain-
ing [6]
3. 9.2 Discussion and Comment s on P arallel Key M anagem ent A p proach es
The approach of merely combining the distributed cert ificate aut hority scheme [1] [65] and
cer t ificate chaining scheme [3] fails to adequately address the key management problem in
MANETs: the composite key management scheme [6] inherits all the weaknesses of the
dist ributed certificate aut hority approach as st ipulated in Sect ion-3 .3.2. In fact , it further
degrad es the security as it only solves tho availabilit y problem of [3] whil e inher iting it s
weak authentication property (see Section-3.6 .3) . The scheme proposed in [3] was des igned
for "open" MANETs. The authors of [0] claim that they improve on [3]' but in fact they
are proposing a scheme for an entirely different app licat ion.
Combining two key man agement approaches to eliminate t he disadvantages of the other
will in mos t cases not be effect ive in MANETs : t he author has investigated a combinat ion
of all key man agement schemes referenced in t his thesis. Only the mobility-b ased ap-
proaches (Section-3 .8 [68] [5]) can be added as a compleme nt to some schemes to enhance
the cert ificate exchange pr ocess by exploit ing user mobili ty. For example, combining t he
mobili ty-b ased approach and the certificate chaining approach will clear ly be more effec-
t ive that combining any one of the two with the distributed cert ificate authority appro ach:
the dis advan tages of the dis tributed certificate aut hority ap proach is, in the view of the
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aut hor, unavoid abl e.
Resear cher s should not be discouraged from looking at ways to combine the exist ing key
man agement schemes, but take caut ion not to create new disadvantages in the process.
A complex int eracti on between the two schemes may also close the window for a strong
secur ity argume nt .
3.10 Conclusions
This chapte r presented a survey on peer-to-peer or pairwise key managem ent for mobile
ad hoc networks (MANET s). Investigation by the author within the published proposals
has shown that the pr otocols can be grouped into several categories. Each category was
discussed by introducing at least t he original proto col from within the grouping. This
way of categorizing the available protocols gives one t he opport unity t o establish a deep er
insight into the available key management approaches in MANETs and to discuss the
st rengt hs and weaknesses of each . From the reviewed key management protocols , the
mobilit y-b ased approaches [5] are the most feasible for fully self-organiz ed key man agement
on the applicat ion layer .
Resear ch by the au thor within the available publications confirmed that adapt ing methods
originally design ed for conventional wireline networks may not be ideal in MANETs. User
mobility and the lack of infr astructure result in sp oradi c connectivity whi ch may resul t
in frequent unavailability of distributed secur ity services . Proto cols therefore have to
exploit user mobility and nodes within each others transmission range (close proximity)
to avoid relying on the routing infr astructure. Dependence on the rou ting infr astructure
during the bo otstrapping of the secur ity mechani sms also results in a routing-security
in terdependence cycle [92].
T he rem aining obs t acles to be eliminate d are the dep endence on mobility during the
boots traping of the routing secur ity and to minimize user inter acti on on the application
layer. Approaches pr esent ed in [105] [106] solve the lat t er problem by effecti vely reducing
user operation down to t he "push of a button" ; users will not use security mechanisms
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that inconvenience them in anyway.
In the view of the author it is import ant to decoup le key management mechanisms intended
for secur ing applicat ion level serv ices from those used to secure the routing infrastructure.
A failur e in the users' ability to judge th e hon esty or intent of other users should not
jeopardize the secur ity of any basic network service.
T he fina l observation is related to t he crite ria used by reseachers to analyse key manage-
merit schemes for MANETs. Key man agement schemes arc designed either for an "open"
or "closed" network and consequent ly aimed at different applications . "Open" or fully
self-organized MANETs have some inherent secur ity implications (see Sect ion-2.1.3 ) and
must be ana lyzed accordingly. It is therefore not always possible to compare schemes that






T he main cont ribut ion of this t hesis is a peer-to-p eer key management scheme t hat is suit-
able for fully self-organized MANETs (see Sect ion-2.1.3). Fully self-organized MANET s
will not find application where user access to the network is restrict ed . The proposed
scheme is designed mainly for "open" MANETs where any person with t he appropriate
equipment can join or leave at random without contacting any t rusted authority. "Open"
MANET s will t hus create commercial applicat ions in a localized geographic cont ext . The
main advant age of "open" MANET s is the significant ly redu ced operating cost for t he
end-user since "open" MANETs do not rely on an operator to deploy and maint ain t he
network infrastructure. The end-user is required to make only a once-off investment in
purchasing an off-t he-shelf product such as a handheld compute r and the necessar y soft-
ware. Users may form a MANET, for example in a shopping center , whi ch enables them
to communicate without payin g a network operator for the service. Other possibl e appli-
cations of "open" MAN ETs are given in Section-2.2. 2. It is clear that fu lly self-organized
MANETs will, for example, not find applicat ion in uehicular ad hoc networks , but rather
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in networks without strong access control.
Some inherent secur ity implicati ons of an "open" MANET are discussed in Sect ion-2.1.3 .
The main disadvan tage of fu lly self-organized networks is that nodes can adopt as many
identi ties as t hey have resources to support [12] (see Sect ion-2.1.3 and Section-2 .3.3.9) .
The capability of an attacker with mul tiple ident it ies in MANET s is an open research
pr oblem [5] and not within the scope of this work.
The proposed key management scheme , Self-Organized Peer-to-Peer Key Management
(SelfOrgP KM), leverages a vari ant of t he EIGamal type signature scheme , su bordinate
p ubl-ic keys and crypto-based identifiers [llO] [45], to achieve low pro tocol complexity
without int roducing excessive communication and computational overhead. SelfOrgP KM
allows nodes to initi alize themselves by generating their own keying materi al before join-
ing the network . The scheme 's operation is fully self-or ganized , with t he burden of key
management uniformly distributed between all network par ti cipants. E ach node is thus
it s own authority domain which , similar to previous schemes [3] [5], is SelfOrgP KM's main
assumpt ion. The nodes establish secur ity associations with t heir one-hop neighb ors on t he
network layer during route est ablishment and on the application layer on a need to kn ow
basis. Wi th resp ect to the routing protocol, a bi-directional secur ity assoc iation between
two nodes, A and B , exists if the nodes have exchanged their t uples [KA, IDA] and [Ka ,
IDH], where K, is node Pi's keying material (symmetric or asymmetric keys) and IDi a
uni que network identifier / address. Note that K, and I D; have to be authent ically bound ,
with the binding between the keying material and node identifier / address publicly verifia-
ble. As with most "open" network s it is left to the user cont rolled applications to further
bind the tuple [K i , I D i ] to a unique user name. Goo d examples of application layer key
establishment mechanisms can be found in [5] [105] [106].
Su bordinate public keys are defined here as public keys that are derived from a user 's self-
gene rated primary or base public/private key pair. In t he t hesis the following properti es
are imp osed on subordinate public keys:
1. A valid subord inate public key can only be generated if the ent ity knows the base/-
prim ary privat e key.
71
Chapte r-d. Proposed Peer-to-Peer Key Management Scheme
2. The user can self -generate a renewed subordinate public key as frequently as needed .
3. The subordinate private key must be statistically ind ependent of the base pr ivate
key and other ren ewed subordinate private keys , i.e, a compromised subordinate
private key does not reveal any informat ion about the user 's base private key or any
future renewed subordinate private keys.
4. There must exist a binding between the user 's base publ ic key and subordinate public
key that supports non-repudiation.
The chapter is organiz ed as follows: in Section-4.2 the related work is briefly surveyed .
Section-4.3 presents a var iant on the generalized EIGamal type signat ure s as a strong
cry ptographic building block for the proposed subordinate public key generation scheme.
Sect ion-4.4 introduces a new subordinate public key generation scheme. In Sect ion-4.5
the new peer-t o-p eer key man agement scheme, SelfOrgPKM , for self-organized MANETs
is proposed .
T his chapter is dedicated to the presentation of the new key management scheme deve loped
by the author. Chapter-5 discusses t he security, performance and features of the proposed
peer- to-peer key man agement scheme. The conclusions provided in Scction- fi .D provide an
overall perspective on the discussions in Chapte r-4 and Chapter-5.
4.2 Brief Summary of Directly Related Work
The existing peer-to-peer key management schemes for MANETs were extensively re-
viewed in Chapter-3. In this sect ion the key man agement schemes most relevant to self-
organ ized MANETs (some not discussed in Chapter-S) will be br iefly summarized.
Capkun et al. [3J pr esent a self-organized public key management scheme based on P ret ty
Goo d Privacy (P GP) [101]. Similar to PGP, each nod e disseminat es its own cert ificates
and keeps a cert ificate repos itory comprising of the cert ificates of nodes in its local neigh-
borhood . Users sh are their certificate repositories and mutually authenticate each other 's
certificate by finding a cert ificate chain linking their cert ificate s (see Secti on-3.6).
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Montenegro et 0.1. [45] and Bobba et 0.1. [92] use crypto-based-ident ifiers to bind node
identifiers to public keys. The notion of using parti al hashes of a mobile node's public
key t o form its network address was originally proposed by O'Shea et 0.1. [110] as an au-
thent ication protocol to protect Mobile IPv6 from address falsification. The cry pto-based
addresses are used in [92] to protect t he basic exchanges between nodes and to bootstrap
the routing secur ity mechanism , effect ively br eakin g the routing-secur ity int erdepend ency
cycle and solving t he address ownership problem.
Lately in [5], Capkun ct. 0.1. have proposed a peer-to-peer key management scheme that
relies on user mobili ty to bring nodes within each ot her 's transmission range, which allows
them to exchange t heir certificate s without relying on a secure routing infr astructure,
The fully self-orga nized version of the scheme requires nodes to use a secure side channel
between the users ' personal devices to aut hent icate each other and to set up shared session
keys. The secret side channel can be a short ra nge connectivity system such as infr ared
or a physical wire [5] (see Section-3.8) .
The impact of these pro to cols on the development of the proposed key man agement
scheme, SelfOrgPKM, is considered in Chapter-5.
4. 3 Modified EIG amal Signature Scheme
In this sect ion a m odifi ed EIGam al typ e signature scheme is presented , developed from the
generalized EIGam al signature: introduced by Horster et 0.1. [111]. The pr esented EIG am al
var iant will be used as a strong cryptographic bu ilding block for the proposed subordinate
pu blic key generation scheme in Sect ion-4.4.
4.3.1 System P ar am et er Setup
T he following syst em parameters arc generated as usual :
p, IJ two large primes, such that IJ I (p - 1).
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9 generator of t he cyclic subgroup of order q in (Z);.
H( ·) collision free one-way hash fun cti on .
x p private key of user P.
yp public key of user P , where yp = g XT' mod p.
It is noted that p can be chosen to ensure a known factori zati on of P - 1 = p~1 , . . . ,p~k ,
where PI , . .. ,Pk are distinct primes . The value 9 can be chosen as follows [41]:
1. Choose a random value h E (Z) ; .
(p - I)
2. Check if h-q- =j. 1 m od p
3. If the incongruence holds t hen 9 I (p - I ) . I'd" . I herwi2 q IS a va 1 primitive e ement , at erwise
repeat from (1) until t he chosen value 9 from (Z) ; satisfi es the incongruence.
4 .3 .2 Signature Generation
User P selects a random number k E [1, q - 1] and computes a public commit ment .,. as :
1" = l m odp
User P signs an ar bit rary message m. by solving the following congruence :
s = x p + [H (m II r )1k mod q
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4 .3 .3 Signature Verification
Any outsider can use user P's public key yp to verify the validity of t he sign ature (s, r)
for a message m by checking whether the following equat ion holds:
(4.3)
4 .4 Proposed Subordinat e Public K ey G ener ation Scheme
The proposed subordinate public key generat ion scheme is based on t he modified EIGamal
signature variant presented in Sectio n-4.3 and borrows concepts from param eter hidden
signature schemes [112] [113].
Self-certified public keys [114] also use concepts from parameter hidd en signature schemes.
The not ion of self-certified public keys was first introduced in [114] and lat er ext ended
in [100]. In self-cert ified public key schemes , the public key is compute d by both the trust ed
author ity and t he user , without the aut hority gaining knowledge of the corresponding
private key.
Consider at first the exist ing scheme given in [100] that can be summarized as follows:
1. A cert ificate authority (CA) chooses rand om number k~ E R Z; , computes r~ = gk~
and t ransmits 'r~ to par ty A.
2. A chooses random number a E H Z; , computes I'll = 1'~ga and transmits (1DII , 1'11)
to CA.
3. CA computes the signature par ameter , s~ = :r:cA[h(IDA, 'fA )] + J.;~ and sends 8~ to
party A.
4. P ar ty A computes the privat e key XA = s~ + a. The tuple (1'A , X A) can be seen as
the signature of the CA on A 's identi ty, 1DA. Par ty A verifies the signatur e of the
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CA and calculate the corresponding public key using equat ion (4.4):
(4.4)
T he proposed scheme, given below, differs from t he above exist ing scheme in a few in-
stances: 1) party A becomes its own authority domain , hence their is no CA involved ;
par ty A will thus play the role of the CA, 2) the proposed scheme is based on the modifi ed
ElGamal signature scheme given in Section-4.3 , in contrast to the blind Schnorr signature
scheme introduced in [113] and 3) the scheme presented in [100] addresses a complete ly
different application.
The proposed subordinate public key scheme is as follows:
The system par amet ers introduced in Section-4.3.1 are applicable. It is assumed that
party A has generate d its own public key/privat e key pair as follows: party A chooses a
random number :I:A E R [1, (j - 1] as its privat e key and computes its corresponding public
key as YA = gXA mod p.
P ar ty A can generate a subordina te public key from its base key pair (XA,YA) tha t satisfies
the properties defined in Secti on-4.1 as follows:
• P arty A chooses a random number kA ER [1, q - 1] and computes r A = gkA mod p .
• P ar ty A computes its new subordinate private key as:
(4.:1)
where the subordinate key information is defined as t:1A = [ID A II YA II rAil
S er No II Lssue Dut.e II ValPe,,·iod /I E :I:tInfo]. Note tha t the contents of [(IA can
be alte red based on the network policy, where IDA is the identity of party A , S er No
a unique sequence number , Lssue.Ir at.« the date of issuing the certificate , V alP er iod
the validity period and E xt/nfo some addit ional exte nsion information.
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• Finally party A computes its correspond ing subord inate pub lic key as:
(4.6)
Party A can renew its subordinate key pair with a self-organized subordinate key renewal
procedure: party A simply chooses a new ra ndom number k~ ER [1, q - 1] and computes
it s renewed sub ordinate pr ivate key as:
x~ = XA + [H (I<I~ ) l k~ m ad q,
where I<I~ = [I D A II YA 111'~ II S erNo + 1 11 I ssueD ate' II Val Periad' II E xt/n I a' ].
(4.7)
4.5 Proposed Fully Self-Organized Peer-to-Peer Key Ma-
nagement Scheme
The discussion on the proposed peer-to-peer key management scheme is st arted with a
problem st atement . This may also be seen as a design specificat ion. In Sect ion- 5.7, it will
argued that the proposed scheme satisfies all t hese require ments.
4. 5.1 Problem Statement
T he problem statement will be : the design , analysis and perform an ce evaluation of a
pee r-to-peer key man agement scheme for fully self-organized mobile ad hoc networks.
T he characterist ics of f ully self-orga nized mobile auhoc networks arc given in Sect ion-2.1.
The proposed key management scheme must satis fy the following general requ irements
(see Section-:U .2):
1. The key management scheme must support a hybrid (symmet ric and asymmetric)
key management system. In ord er to relax the requirement for a confident ial channel,
the initi al keying material must be distributed via an asymmetric key system.
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2. All keying material (public keys) must be publicly verifiable to be explicitly authen-
ti c.
3. The key fr eshness property in Section-3 .1.2 is adapted for an asymmet ric system,
hence it is required that all users ' privat e keys are independent. A user 's renewed
keying mat erial must also be independ ent.
4. The scheme must protect t he privat e keys of users in the presen ce of the active,
insider adversary, thus also provide resistance to known key at t acks and ensure
forward and backward secrecy.
5. The key man agement scheme must satisfy the survivability property, hence the
scheme must remain available in the pr esence of threats and failures. Note that
unavailabili ty as a result of an attack on t he routing and other basic mechani sms , is
not within t he scope of this work. The key management scheme will have to rely on
various ot her mechanisms, such as an intrusion detection mechanism [115], to fully
deal with Th e Three Rs of survivability given in Section-3.1.2 .
6. Robustness of the key management scheme must be ensure d .
7. All operat ions of the scheme should optimize the use of communicat ion , storage and
comput at ional resources, both in the initialization and post-initialization ph ases.
The scheme should therefore not degrade the network performance.
8. The last requirement to be satisfi ed as given in Sect ion-3.1.2 is sca lability: the key
management service mus t allow for changes in node densi ty.
Although SelfOrgPKM does not explicit ly define a symmetric key establishment protocol
t o set up session keys between users, it is noted that such mechanism should not viol at e
the perfect forward secrecy property.
In addit ion to the above generic requirement s , the following properti es mus t be provided
by the proposed key management scheme:
9. T he exchange of keying material should be on-d emand: each user will cre ate it s
own keying material and only exchange keyin g material with other nodes if the
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keying material is needed by ot her mechanisms (such as the routing prot ocol and
user ap plica t ions).
10. The key man agement scheme must break the routing-security interd ependence cycle
as defined in [92]. In fact , it is required that the key man agement scheme should not
be dependent on the routing infr astructure at all.
11. In an "open" network, adversaries should not be able to sp oof the network addresses
of other nodes. The proposed scheme must t hus solve t he address ownership problem
as defined in [110] [45] .
12. The key man agement scheme must be fully distributed . This means than an ad-
versary can compromise any number of nodes and not break the key management
service. This property will also preserve t he symmetr ic relationship between the
nodes and help to ensure sur vivability.
13. An increase in no de mobility shou ld not affect t he operation of the proposed key
man agement scheme . In fact it is required that the key management scheme exploits
mobility.
14. Although t he key man agement scheme may exploit mobi lity it must not rely on node
mobility.
15. The setup of security associations should not suffer from any noti ceable t ime delay.
16. A st rong security arguemcnt for the proposed key man agement scheme must be
traceable to a hard mat hematical problem within a widely accepted security model.
17. Complexity is t he biggest enemy of any security system [116]. Low complexity is one
of the key design const rai nts of the proposed key management scheme. The scheme
must be pr acti cal and thus easy to implement.
18. The scheme should be fully modularized , hence its components must be independent
and usable in other applications.
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4.5.2 System Model
The proposed peer-to-p eer key management scheme for MANETs, called SelfOrgP KM,
uses subo rdinate public keys (pr esented in Secti on-4.4 ) and cry pto-based identifiers [110]
[45] as strong cry ptographic building blo cks to set up secur ity associations between nodes.
The boo tstrapping of the secur ity service introduces minimal communicat ion and compu-
t ational overhead and does not require any form of off-line or on-lin e TTP. This property
is consistent with the characterist ics of fully self-organi zed MANETs as defined by [3] [5] .
The pr oposed scheme considers a network of wireless nodes with low to high mobili ty
speeds (l m /s - 20m/s) . The medium access cont rol (MAC) and routing mechan isms
are assumed to be generic. T he network is open for any user to join or leave at random
without restricted access. The spec ific application of the scheme will t herefore not be for
mili t ar y typ e mobile ad hoc networks, which have a high secur ity demand, but rather for
commercial or ot her less access const rained environments.
It is assumed that there is no pre-existing infr astructure and no form of on-line or off-line
trusted aut hor ity; before users join the network they have to determine what univers al
set of system param eters are used in the network . SelfOrgPKM assumes that t he users
have system param eter sets pre-im aged on their nodes and that users publicly establish
which set to use. Secure system parameter exchanges , wit hout prior kn owledge or any user
interaction , is an interesting direction for future research. Each node generates a discret e
logarithm public/private key pair. By hashing t he base public key with a one-way collision
resistan t hash fun cti on , nodes obtain a unique network identifier / address. The propo sed
scheme inherit s this idea from the origina l proposal of O'Shea et al. [110]. The base or
originally generated key pair is never used for any real communication to protect it from
at t acks on t he cryptographic algorit hms used to secure communicat ion [100] [41]. The
users rather derive a second or subord inate pub lic/ pri vate key pair from their base key
pair as spec ified in Sect ion-4.4 . Each user then generates a self-certificate to bind other
useful information to t heir keying material such as a un ique sequence number , expiry date
et c.
Any user with a valid self-generated certificate can join the network. As in the initializati on
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ph ase, each nod e is its own authority dom ain during network operation and therefore
responsible for the renewal and disseminat ion of its own self-cert ificate s. Nod es within
each ot her 's transmission range exchange certificates during route establishment on the
network layer and users exchange their certificates on the app lication layer on a need to
know basis, thus only when they want to communicate secure ly.
4 .5 .3 Adver sa ry M odel
SelfOrgP KM considers a st raight forwar d , general adversary model. An adversary is a
malicious node that uses every means available to break the proposed key man agement
scheme. Any active adversary can eavesdrop on all t he communication between nod es,
modify t he content of messages and inject t hem back int o t he wireless channe l. When a
node is compromised all it s public and private information is exposed to the adversary.
As det ailed in Section-2 .3.2, an act ive, insider adversary is assumed.
The operation of SelfOrgP KM is divided into a node initialization ph ase which is executed
by each node before the nod e joins the network and post-initi alizati on which executes
during network operation.
4 .5.4 Initialization Phase of Se lfOrgP K M
Each nod e Pi , for (1 ~ i ~ n) , creates a base public/privat e key pair (Xi ,Yi ) by choosing
a random number Xi E n [1, q - 1] as its base private key and computes its corresponding
public key as Yi = o": mod p. It is assumed t hat each node has an aut hent ic image of the
system parameters, as specified in Sect ion-4.3.1.
Each node generates a unique identifi er (IDi) that is bound to its base public key Yi as
follows:
(4.8)
SelfOrgP KM requires I D, to be used as the node's network address or as a fixed par t of the
add ress . Note t hat this requirement places no constraint on the st ructure of the network
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addresses: the ent ire hash output , I Di , can be used in MANETs with flat , stat ic addresses
or only a par t of t he output can be used in MANETs with dyn ami c addressing. Note t hat
SelfOrgP KM can eas ily be extended to incorporate strong network access cont rol at the
cost of losing t he self-organized feature : an off-line t rusted authority can bind I Di , 11i and
a uni que username by generating a cert ificate for Pi signed by t he aut hority.
Each node Pi uses it s base pub lic/private key pair (Xi!Yi) to generate a subordina te pu b-
lic/ private key pair ( x~ , vD as specified in Sect ion-4.4 .
Not e t hat Pi 'S base key pair (Xi : y;) is never used for real communicat ion . Rather , each
Pi uses it s subordinate key pair (x~, y;) for secur ing act ua l communicat ion,
To obt ain an explicitly authent ic key pair each node uses it s newly obtained subordinate
privat e key .7:A to sign the key information content, I( Ii (concatenate d with it s subordinate
pub lic key Y; and pu blic commitment 13D via the modified EIG am al sign at ure scheme
pr esent ed in Secti on-d.S. Node Pi'S self-certificate can then be defined as : S d f Gcrt: =
[K I; IIY: II 0:: II 13n, where (0:: ,13;) is t he appended signat ure on K I; II y: 11 13;.
4 .5 .5 Post-Initialization Phase of SelfOrgPKM
T he post-ini ti alizat ion ph ase comrnences afte r network format ion . Each node must per-
form t he init ializat ion ph ase, as present ed in Section-4.5.4, before join ing the network.
4 .5 .5 .1 C ertificat e Exchange a n d Authentication
Cert ificate exchange takes place between nodes on a peer-to-p eer , need-to-know basis.
Nodes set up a bidirectiona l secur ity asso ciation by exchanging their renewed self-certificates,
S elf Ce rt', SelfOrgP KM requires all nodes to exchange self-cert ificates wit h their one-hop
neighbors on the network layer. As shown in F igure-4.1, nodes wit hin each ot her 's trans-
mission range exchange their cert ificates during rout e establishment . The scope of t his
work is limited to on-demand rou ting wit hout bind ing the proposed scheme to a specific
rout ing protocol. The sourc e node st ar t s as usu al with a broadcast route request. T wo
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_ On e-hop, peer-to-peer self-certificate exchange on network layer
.. - -. Self-eertiticate exchange via established route on application layer
Fi gure 4.1: SelfOrgPKM certi ficate exchange
unicast messages ar e needed for subsequent certificat e exchange (if the source and neigh-
boring node have not done so already): one message from the neighboring node and one
message from the source node. This process cont inues until the route request reaches
the destination node, hence the route requests serve as triggers for cert ificate exchanges
between neighboring nodes in the route discovery ph ase.
It is trivial to see that t he one-hop network layer cert ificate exchange mechanism makes
tho secur ity schem e indep endent of t he routing-security int erdep endence cycle as defined
in [92J.
The example, illustrated in Figure-4.1, also explains certificate exchanges at t he ap plica-
t ion layer: assume NodeA wants to communicate secure ly with N ode IJ. In the first round
Node s sends to Nodes a C ert Reques t requesting S el fCe rt's from Nodes over the est ab-
lished route. Not e that Cert R equest cont ains the cer tificate SelfCert~ . If Nodes grants
the request it replies in t he second round with Sel fCert's . Note that t his two-round
procedure requires no synchrony between Node s. and N oden .
Refer to Section-5.5 for a det ailed example of SelfOrgPKM's cert ificate exchange mecha-
nism.
The self-cert ificates and subordinate public keys of N odeA and Nodes are aut hent icated
as follows :
1) Each node implicitly authent icates the base public key of it s peer nod e by checking if
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Equation-4.8 holds.
2) Next , t he peer nod es implicitl y authenticate t he subordinate public keys of t he ir peers
by checking if Equation-4.6 holds.
3) Fi nally each nod e validates t he self-certificate of its peer node, Sel j Certi, by verifying
the signat ure (0:;, 13;) on [K l, II yJ This explicitly authent icates both t he base public key
y,of Node, and the subordinate public key y;. If t he node identifi er I D, mat ches the hash
output t he nod e is also assured that the identifier / address has not be en spoofed by Node..
If all t hree of t he above veri ficat ion st eps hold , t hen t he subordinate public key y; is
explicitl y authent ic and securely bo und to t he base pu blic keYYi, which in t urn is securely
bound to t he nodes statistically unique identifier / address.
If t he certificat e t rans fer fails du e to error-pro ne connect ivity or un su ccessful aut hentica-
tion , N odeA will retry by resending CertRequest.
For efficiency reasons nodes can use sym metric key schemes to secure all subsequent mes-
sages. This can eas ily be achieved by using the available aut henticated public keys to
est ablish a session key between peers.
4.5.5.2 Certificate Revocation
SelfOrgP KM makes use of a self-revocation system based on a self-organized subo rdinate
key renewal pro cedure. As mentioned in Sect ion-4.5.4 , nodes do not use t heir base key
pair for any real communication, but must derive a subordinate key pair (x; , yD from t he
base key pair whi ch is t hen used for actual communicat ion . This significantly reduces t he
chance of a successful at t ack on a node's base key pair [100] [41]. The self-organized key
renewal pro cess given in Section-4.4 can be used by the nod e to obtain a renewed key
pair (x;' ,yn at any point in t ime during the post initi alizat ion oper ation of t he net.work.
The node will thus derive a new private key x;' = Xi + H (KIDk; m od q and generate a
new self-cert ificate S el fCer( = [KI; II y? II 0::' II 13;']. The renewed cert ificate S elfCert:'
can be sent to the nod e's frequen t contacts or offered to ot her nod es on communication
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initialization . Since nodes are respo nsible for their own keying mat er ial t hey can re new
their subordinate key pair as frequently as desired. Nodes will however most likely renew
their key pair in two inst an ces: when t hey suspect that their subordinate privat e key has
been compromised or when t heir set validi ty periods Va lPe rio d' have expired.
4.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter proposed a novel peer- t o-peer key man agement scheme for fully self-organized
MANETs, called SelfOrgP KM. The introducti on of the pr op osal was st ar t ed by briefly
summarizing the exist ing lit erature closely related to SelfOrgP KM (Section-4.2) . Two
generic building blocks for SelfOrgP KM was pr esented. The first building block, intro-
duced in Secti on-4.3, is a signature scheme develop ed from the generalized El Gamal sign a-
ture variant [111]. T he ElGamal signature forms the basis of the second building block of
SelfOrgP KM. The novel noti on of subordinate public keys was introduced . Furthermore,
a subordinate pu blic key generation scheme was proposed that allows a user to derive a
second public/private key pair from its base key pair (Sect ion-4.4) .
The discussion on SelfOrgPKM started in Secti on-4.5.1 with a problem statement that
clearly defines the design speci fications for the proposed key man agement scheme. The
following sections introduced the system and adversary mod els for SelfOrgP KM (Section-
4.5.2 and Sect ion-4 .G .3) . This laid the foundat ion to present t he det ails of SelfOrgP KM in
Section-4 .5.4 and Section-4.5.5 . T he discussion was divided into an off-line init ia lization
phase and on-line post-init ia lization ph ase. The initi alization phase describes how users
generate their own keying materi al (self-certificates) pri or to joining the network. The
post-init ialization phase deal primarily wit h the novel certificate exchange mechani sm on
the network layer.
The discussion on t he pr op osed scheme is cont inued in Chapter-fl. Chapter-S focuses on
the features, secur ity and performance evaluation of SelfOrgP KM and it s building blocks.









The proposed peer- to-p eer key man agement scheme for MANETs, presented in Secti on-
4.G, makes use of subordinate public keys and crypto-based identifiers as building blocks
to effect ively eliminate the need for any form of off-line or on-line TTP. Self-organized
MANET s by definit ion do not have any form of off-line TTP [3] [G] (see Sect ion-2 .1.3 ). This
makes schemes such as [1] [2] [65] unsui table for self-organized MAN ET s. The weaknesses
of t hese exist ing schemes exte nd into network formati on. T hey use a distributed cert ificate
author ity (DCA) as an on-line TTP which can be at t acked. T he proposed scheme avoids
these weaknesses by using a fully distributed syste m where each node becomes its own
authority domai n.
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The exist ing schemes that take t he characteristics of fully self-organized MANETs into
consideration have t he following main weaknesses (see Section-4.2):
1) The certificat e chaining based key management approach, pr esented in [3], only provides
weak cert ificate authent icat ion and may fail to provide certificate chai ns between all node
pairs in the network during the initialization ph ase (see Secti on-3.6.3).
2) The maj or weakness of the cry pto-based ident ifier approach [110] [45] [92] is that users
cannot revoke their public keys without changing their network addresses and/or ident ifiers
[5]. In [92], the rou ting pro tocol cont rol packets are extended by appending a users public
key to route requests. Wi th the high number of route requests sent by t he on-demand
routing pro tocols this leads to significant addit iona l overhead .
3) The mobility bas ed key management approach in [S] introduces a time delay in t he
setting up of the secur ity associations . The fully self-orga nized scheme relies on nod e mo-
bili ty to ensure t hat sufficient nodes come into physical contact . Asking of users to actively
set up securi ty associations with every node they meet may be a strong requirement . As
noted by the authors of [G], t he fully self-organized methods proposed in [5] are ideally
suite d to set up security assoc iations on the application layer (see Secti on-3.8.3).
In genera l, all t hree of these approaches have strong points which are adequately high-
lighted by the authors. Some of these concepts have been incorporated into SelfOrgPKM
and d early referenc ed when used.
The proposed scheme does not suffer from any of the above weaknesses: SelfOrgPKM in-
herits t he main benefit s of crypto-based ident ifiers [110] [45] [92] as a means of solving the
address ownership problem. Subordinate public keys introduced in Section-4.4 are used
for real communication, leaving an adversary with a brute-force at tack as the only opti on
to compromise a nod e's base public/private key pair and/or ident ifier [100] [41]. The sub-
ordinate key pairs can be eas ily renewed without having to mo dify the base public key
pair which keeps the nodes ' identifiers constant . With the proposed certificate exchange
mechanism users do not experience any noti ceable time delay in the set up of security
associat ions and distributi on of t heir own cert ificates. SelfOrgPKM exploits the routing
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cont rol packet s to t rigger localized certificate exchanges without extending t he routing
packets. Certificates can be explicit ly aut hent icated with low computat ional overhead.
The characterist ics of "open" networks inherently make them vulnerab le to Syb il at tacks ,
as defined in [12] (see Section-2 .1.3). As mentioned before, the effect of nodes with mu ltiple
ident ities in MANETs could be an interesting future resear ch topic. Mor e import antly, in
"open" networks, nodes shou ld not be able to imp ersonate other network nodes, hence the
key management protocol must ensure that a node's ident ity/ add ress cannot be falsified
and that the binding between the node's identity and keyin g material cannot be forged .
The user 's cert ificate must therefore be explicit ly authent icated . This will be the focus in
the remainder of the security discussion.
5.2 On the Security of SelfOrgPKM
Considering the proposed scheme's system model and adversary model, given in Section-
4.5.2 and Sect ion-4.5 .3 resp ectively, it becomes d ear that an advers ary will attack the
scheme mainly in the following ways:
1. SelfOrgPKM uses a one-way collision resist ant hash function to uniquely hind the
no des ' public keys and network identifiers. From Equation-4.8, an adversary can
at tempt to spoof the ident ity/ address of user Pi , by generat ing a forged public key
y: that hash es to the same I Di. This is ana logous to finding a collision on a strong
hash function such that IDi = H (Yi) = H (y:).
2. The proposed key management scheme uses the sub ordinate pub lic key generat ion
scheme given in Section-4.4 with a twofold obj ective. . Firstly, the scheme allows
users to derive a secondary public/private key pair used for real communication
thereby forcing the adversary to dir ectl y derive the privat e key from the public key,
i.e. find l09g Vi · Second ly, it provides the nodes with an efficient comput at ional and
communicat ion method of frequently renewing their keying mat erial. T hus, from
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Equation- 4.6, an adversary can attempt to obtain a forged subo rdinate public key
]/:' t hat satisfies 11;' = gX:' = 11i( r'D H ( K l ;J motl p.
3. Users generate self-certificates to bind their key pair s to their keying information
K Ii as defined in Section-4.4. An adversary may attempt to forge a self-certificate
by binding a forged subordinate pu blic key y;' to the users valid keying information
Kh
4. T he only messages an advers ary can intercept and alte r ar e the cert ificates exchange d
between nod es. While SelfOr gPKM prevents adversaries from forgin g certificates ,
miti gating all attacks on the network and lower layers that may t hwart reliabl e corn-
munication, is not within the scope of t his work. SelfOrgPKM does however pr ovide
the network layer with cry ptogra phic keying mater ial without relying on a route
establishment mechani sm , thereby breaking the routing-security interdep endency
cycle [92J .
The goal of the discussion on the secur ity of SelfOrg PKM is to show that the pr op osed
scheme is secure within the given informal adversary model, i.e. it avoids the main angles
of attack pointed out in (1 to 4) above. T he strong modular ization of SelfOrgPKM makes
it possible to break up the angles of attack as described above. T he secur ity of the
self-certificate generation and subord inate public key generation pro cedures are largely
based on the secur ity of the EIGam al ty pe signat ure scheme pr esented in Secti on-4.3. T he
secur ity discussion is t hus divided into t hree par ts:
• Firstl y, the mo dified generalized EIGamal ty pe signature variant, presented in Section-
4.3, is proved secure within the combined secur ity model, the Random Or acle and
Generi c Model (ROM+GM), proposed by Schnorr et al. [11 7J [118J. Alt hough t his
mo del is mainly of theoretical interest , t he proof provides some form of guarantee
that the signature scheme cannot be broken based on widely acce pted cryptographic
assumptions . T he two main assumptions in ROM+ GM are the existence of an ideal
hash function and ideal gro up G of pr ime orde r q. T here exist hash fun cti ons and
gro ups that have shown to be pr act ical (but limi ted ) inst an ces of such ideal oracles .
89
Cha pter-5 . Performan ce and Secnr ity Evalua t ion of th e PropoRed Peer-to-P eer Key 1\1an agement Scheme
• Secon dly, it is show n that verifying a user 's self-certificate via verification of the
ElGamal ty pe signature on the self-certificate content J(I II y' and validating t he
subordinate public key with Equ ati on-4.6, yields the user 's subordinate and base
public key explicitly authentic.
• Las tly, t he pr obabili ty of an adversary finding a collision on a strong hash fun cti on
and thus spoofi ng network addresses or identifiers is investigated .
The philosophy behind the given secur ity analysis is suppo rted by Kobli t z and Menezes
in [119].
5.2.1 Security Proof for the Presented EIGamal Signature Scheme
In t he followin g pr oof refer ence is mad e to the combined secur ity mod el , t he Random
Oracle and Generic Model (ROM+GM) , proposed by Schnorr et al. [117] [118]. Note that
the formal adversary mo del as defined by Schnorr et al. is ap plicable.
In the first par t of t he secur ity proof for the proposed peer- to-p eer key man agement
scheme, SelfOrgP KM, it will be shown that the modified generalized ElGamal type sig-
nature variant pr esented in Secti on-4.3, is secure against t he on e-more siqnaiure JU1"g eTy
at t ack [117] in the ROM+ GM secur ity model.
Theorem 1. Lei a qeneric tuiucrsom] A interact wi th a siqner and b« qiucn. the qcneraior
g , the public key y and an oracle Jar H. A performs t generic steps which include I
seque n tial signer' in terac ti ons. With a pmbability spa ce cousistinq o] y , H and coin jiips
o] the signer , i t is not pos sibl e Jar A to produce l + 1 signatures with a probability better
than illq .
In the following proof Lem m a 1 an d Lem m a 2 are those defined and proved in [117].
Proof. [following Schnorr et al. [117]]
f:'+ x
As given by Lemma A defined below, the group element }il = g C;g- S- = g(n1f ,(1,x,k ))
f
~ .
for an ar bitrary i :S t' , A receives hash query c~ = H (m II g C i g - S- ) an d needs to find s~
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which satisfies Equ ation- 5.3. The adversary A is t hus required to solve a linear polynomial
:1: + c; (nil, (1, :1:, k )) at (:1:, k) . By Lemma 2 presented in [117], :1: is statist ically independent
from (ai' , (l ,x ,k )), excluding prior collisions li = h. By Lemma 1 pr esented in [117],
it is known that such collisions will only occur with an upper hound prob ability of (p.
On the other hand , by Lemma A , adversary A must choose C1, . .. . c; for each signature
(m,;, (;; ,8;) that satisfies Equation- Ii.l such that :1: cance ls out . In the case of a seque nt ial
at t ack, without any collisions among the computed gro up elements It , . . . , f tl , t he system
Qof I + 1 equat ions for (;1, . . . , (;/ is solvable with an upper bound probability of ~ ,whcre
C/) (,") (') (')
t il denotes thc number of queries to H [117] . It follows from ll.L + ssu. < --L t hat ill isq q - q > q
the highest probability for A to su cceed in a sequenti al, one-more signature at tack on the
signature scheme pr esented in Scction-4.3. o
Lemma A . Let the tripl et (m; , c;, S't') be a signature with a probabilit y better than 1.. Th e
. q
c; -coordinaie then coincides with the value H (m II I) corresponding to the hash query
(m II I) . From Equation-4· 3, gk = g~g- ~. Th e hash query (m II I) E G x M, satisfies
I
~ - -'!rc; = H(m. II f) = H(m. II g C;g C; ), uiliere the yTOUp elemen t f = II for' sotne arbitran;
1 ::; i' ::; t' . Th e parameters (m;,C;, s;) also satisfy:
(5.1)
1
- (Yi', 1 + L~=1 [Ui' ,k c; 1]
C; = --------,------,-
[ / ]I I Sksi = < ai' ,O+L »>:
k=1 k
(5.2)
In the following proof, Lemma 2 is as defined and proved in [117] .
Proof. [following Schnorr et al. [117]]
Since 1 ::; i' ::; t' denotes the ind ex of f among the computed gro up elements h ,. . . ,i; t he
I
~ _ x
gr oup clement can be wri tten as Ii' = g C, g ;:; = g (OI/ ,( Lx ,k » . It follows from the pr evious





gCi g- ;:; = x + c;(a i/, (l ,x , k )) (5.3)
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In order for the generic adversary A to calculate the correct .s~ , A must find <such t hat
x cancels out . A must therefore select Cl, . . . , C/ t hat sat isfy Equation-5.1.
If x cancels out, s~ can be computed by A as sp ecified by Equation- 5.2 .
III t he case that :1; does not cancel out ill t he equa lity given hy Equ ati on-Ii.d, t he equality
will only hold with probability ~ since x is stat ist ically independ ent of non-group dat a by
Lemma 2 presented ill [117]. 0
5.2.2 On the Security of the Proposed Subordinate Public Key Gene-
ration Scheme
Subsequent security discussions will take on a more informal approach. From any ent ity's
perspect ive Equ at ion-4.6 can only provide implic i t authent ica t ion of subordina te public
key y~ , i.e. t he verificat ion pro cedure gives no assurance that Pi knows t he corresponding
private key x~ . The authenticity of the subordina te public key only becomes explicit when
Pi uses it for a cryptographic pro cedure which inh erently provides a proof of knowl edge
of x~ .
An adversary A that wants to produce a forged subordinate pu blic key must compute a
pub lic key y'.A that satisfies:
(5.5)
A does not know 10g!JY'.A and will consequent ly fail to produce a valid signatur e that
satisfies Equat ion-4.3. T his serves as motivation for introducing self-certificate generat ion
in Sect ion-4.5.4 , which allows the subordinate public keys to be explicit ly authent icated .
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It will t hus be appropriate to assess t he secur ity of the prop osed subordinate public key
generation protocol in conjunction with the signature (n~,fjD on "II"i = [K Ii II yn as
describe d in Section-4.5.4. It is noted that (a~ , 13:) is produced via the proposed signat ure
sche me present ed in Scction-4.3. The verification equation on (a~, fJD is given as:
(5.6)
Subst it uting Equation-4.6 into Equation-5.6 yields :
which has the following signa ture equation:
a; = xi + H( K Ii)(ki)
+H irn, II J3~)( 10g9J3D mod q
(5.7)
(5.S)
An ent ity which explicit ly aut hent icates Y~ via Equation-4.6 and Equation-5.6 , ind irectly
verifies Equation-5.S in two steps . From Equation-5.7 and Equation- 5.S it is concluded
that an adversary A can only generate a forged subordinate public key with an upper
bo und probabi lity of ~ in the ROM+ GM secur ity model (by Th eorem 1). Furthermore
it shows that the verifier of Eq uation-d.f and Eq uation-fi .f can be assured t hat the party
with I Di , generated via Equation-4.S, knows the base private key Xi corresponding to Yi .
Another point of concern is that a compromise of the subordinate pri vat e keys may reveal
information about the base or primary pri vat e key. From Equat ion-4.2 and Equation-4 .5
it can be seen that the base private key Xi is blind ed from t he subordinate private key
x; by the additio n of a random number ki. This is t he same mechanism that is used
by all ElGamal type signatures to protect private keys from being derived from valid
signatures . An adversary A t hat compromises a subordinate key pair (x~ , V:) t herefore has
the same probabili ty of gaining knowledge of the base private key Xi as someone with a
valid signature (8i, Ti), generated via t he signa t ure scheme presented in Section-4 .3.
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Note that the subordinate public key generation scheme, proposed in Section-4.4, satisfies
all t he requirements of a subordinate scheme as defined in Section-4.1.
5.2.3 On the Security of Hash Based Identifiers
The securi ty of crypto-based ident ifiers has been exte nsively reviewed in [45] [120] [110]
[92]. To avoid repetition t his section will only bri efiy consider the security of hash fun c-
ti ons . As not ed from the specification of the proposed key man agement scheme, SelfOrg-
PKM is not bound to any sp ecific hash fun ction. Such a secure hash function can be
carefu lly chosen on deployment of the protocol. For example, cur rent ly SHA-1 [121] with
a 160-bi t output will provide adequate secur ity since 280 hash operations are needed to
find a collision on SHA-1 using a brute-force attack. The most recent known at tack on
SHA-1 , presented in [122], shows that a collision on SHA-1 can be found with a complexity
of less than 269 hash ope ra ti ons . Note however , that an at t acker also has the addit ional
comput at iona l overhead of one full exponent iat ion in order to find a valid public key before
comput ing t he hash fun ction. Clearly the additi ona l t ime complexity of the exponent iation
makes the spoofing of network addresses impractical.
5.3 On the Efficiency of SelfOrgPKM
SelfOrgP KM is fully distributed , preserv ing the symmetric relationship between nodes as
required in MAN ETs. The proposed peer-to-p eer key management scheme thus places
the same communica tion and computational burden on each node, which in the view
of the aut hor , is t he first step towards mitigating selfishn ess attacks and extending the
nodes ' battery life. In the next two subsections the performance of SelfOrgPKM will be
investigated in an ideal network setting, hence assuming guaranteed connect ivity. Section-
5.5 evaluates t he performance of SelfOrgPKM in a simulat ion study where factors su ch
as connectivity and route failures (du e to the error-prone wirel ess channel, node mobility
etc .) have an imp act on the system operation.
94
Cha pt.er-5 . Performan ce and Secur it.y Evaluat.ion of t.he Proposed Peer-t.o-Peer Key l\Ianagem ent. Schem e
5.3 .1 Efficiency of Sel fOrgPKM Initialization P hase
The initialization ph ase is performed by each node before joining the network and therefore
has no impact on network performance. This pro cess should however st ill be as efficient as
possibl e. Each node Pi performs 4 exponent iat ions (e:r.p) , :3 random number generat ions
(Rg c71 ) and 3 hash computat ions (H(·)) (T he 2 mul tiplicati ons and 2 summations have
insignificant impact on the time complexity in comparison with the exponent iat ions). The
initialization ph ase has no communicat ion cost.
5.3.2 E fficiency of Se lfOrgP KM P ost-Initialization Phase
T he on-line post-initialization ph ase of SelfOrgPKM results in lit tle overhead for each
node. A node renewing its self-certificate has to perform only 2 signature generat ions
and 1 exponent iation to compute its renewed subordinate public key with a total cost
of 3 exp, 2 Rgen and 2 H (·). Any nod e can verify another node's self-certificate with a
computat ional cost of 3 exp and 1 H (.) and only 3 exp for all subsequent verifications
since t he base publi c key has to be authent icate d only once.
Self-certificate exchanges on a peer-to-peer basis (on the applicat ion and network layers)
are the only communicat ion overhead imposed on the network by t he proposed scheme.
A certificate exchange pro cedure on the applicat ion and netwo rk layer only takes 2 asyn-
chronous rounds with 1 un icast message from each nod e.
5.4 P erformance Evaluation Approaches
In practi ce there exist two main approaches to evalua te applications for wir eless mobile ad
hoc networks (MANET s) : simulations and real test beds [123]. Both of t hese approaches
have their advantages and disadvant ages [123J [124] [125J (to be discussed shortly).
A third , less common, approach is emulation, which exploit s t he advantages of both si-
mu lations and te st beds. The 'emulat ion' approach is unfortun ately fairl y novel and
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places higher requirements on the memory and computationa l resources of the emula-
t ion / simulation server.
Theoreti cal ana lysis on communication protocols is normally used to verify the validi ty
of simulat ion result s. Theoreti cal results are obtained from deriving a model that math-
ematically describ es the functionality of the communication proto col under investigation .
Such a model should also t ake into consideration the characterist ics of (and int eracti on be-
tween) the underlying communicat ion infr astructure and the protocol under investigati on.
The performance of the key man agement scheme is directly depend ent on the operat ion
of the routing pro tocol, MAC protocol and nod e mobili ty model. In order to perform
theoret ical analysis on t he prop osed scheme, SclfOrgP KM, a model is needed that effec-
t ively captures the functi onality of an entire mobile ad hoc network. Investigation by t he
author has confirmed that such a model has not been at te mpted in lit erature, the reason
for which becomes apparent if the complexity of the problem is considered. This is also
evident from the fact that none of the most reput able papers, discussed in sections 3.3
to 3.9, offer a comparison between a theoretical evaluation and simulation result s in an
attempt t o valid ate simulat ion results.
In order to make an intuitive decision on which of the approac hes to use for evaluating
the proposed scheme, SelfOrgP KM, each feasible method will be bri efly investi gat ed.
5 .4.1 Approach 1: R eal Test B eds
Real test beds can provide very rea listic results and to a great exte nt illust rate t he prac-
ti cality of the network based applicat ion under investigation. The qu ality of the resul ts
however depend s heavily on how closely the tes t bed repr esents the deployment of the
network in practice. Aspects to consider, in ord er to guarantee t he validity of the results,
would be (amongst ot hers) the ty pe of nodes t hat will be used in the field , the nodes '
available resources (such as processing power , memory, battery life, phys ical size et c.) ,
expected mobility of the users, t he users network traffic profile, the number of users par-
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Three disadvant ages of real test beds make the approach unsuit able for evaluating network
dependent applications:
• High cost of deployment.
• High lab or int ensity.
• Non-repeat ab ility of results .
Take for example t he evaluation of a group key management scheme designed for MANETs.
Gro up communication in MANETs will generally occur in t he form of dyna mic peer groups
(DP Gs) and t hus have group membership in the order of a hundred nodes [46] [126].
The major challenge in the field of group key management is to design protocols t hat
are efficient ly scalable and t herefore can accommodate dynami c group memb ership, i.e.
memb ers joining and leaving at rand om. A real test bed for testing DPG pro tocols will
require at the least 150 nodes as DPG sizes of 50 to 100 nodes are of interest. The
considerable cost of such a test bed should be apparent . There are however ot her problems
with test beds that make their use with respect to MANETs impractical. MANETs, du e
to node mobility, have rapidly changing , random network to pologies. If a research insti tute
could afford the infrastructure, each of t hese nodes needs to be mobile, moving at speeds
of up to 20m/ s (which is t he maximum mobility rate used in numerous rou ting pro to col
simulat ions) . As a consequence , besides the t ime and effort required to configure all
these nodes, performing meaningful tests could be labor intensive and will require skillful
organization. Real test beds t hus pose logisti c imp ossibili ti es [125]. Finally, such tes ts
cannot be repeated since the test condit ions can be affected by many factors such as
channel character ist ics, mobility pat tern s, error-prone wireless connectivity and so for th.
5.4.2 Approach 2: Simulators
Simulat ion offers t he capability to repeat and control the network environment and to
precisely specify the simulat ion scenario [123]. Wi th the usc of a simulation package such
as ns2 [127] and GloMoSim [109], wireless network protocol designers can get a detailed
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account of events that occur in the given network scenario. ' The most widely adopte d
simulator is ns2 du e t o its enhanced features and potenti al to serve as a common platform
for comparing newly proposed protocols with exist ing pro t ocols. By implementing the
protocols within ns2, these protocols can he simulated by exploit ing the lower layer models
provided by the simulator.
In some cases a simulation impl ementati on of a prot.ocol results in an unrealis ti c simplifica-
tion of the protocol. The results obt ained from simulat ion may therefore significantly differ
from what. may be found in a "real world " applicat ion . The correctness of the results relics
heavily on the implementor's underst anding of the pro tocol and the simulator in which
the protocol is implemented [128]. Secondly, the implement.or may (unknowingly) exploit.
his/her control over the system in order to achieve a desired resul t . The disadvantages of
simulations may inherently cast doubt over the results obtain ed from simulati ons.
5.4.3 Approach 3: Emulators
Simulations are referred to as emulations when the event scheduler needs to perform
all it s actions in real t ime. The ns2 simulator provides network obj ects and t ap agent s
that allows for the injection of real network dat a into the simulator (emulator). It is
experiment ally shown that emulations can evaluate an application mu ch more realistically
than its counte rparts [129] [130]. (There are also numerous other advant ages to emulat ion
with resp ect to real test beds and simulators that will not be considered here. ) There
is however one maj or problem with emulatio n that will be very difficult to overcome.
Since the scheduler has to keep up with external events in real time it requires significant
computationa l resources. Such resources can only be provid ed by advanced distributed and
parallel processin g techniques and hardware. This requirement introduces a cost factor
which makes emulation in general impracti cal.
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5.4.4 Conclusions on Protocol Evaluation Approaches
Fro m t he discussion on real test beds, simulation and emulation , it is evident that simu-
lation is current ly the only practi cal approac h to evaluate network dependent protocols in
MANET s. T he ns2 simulato r [127] takes preference over GloMoSim [109] du e to its wide
use in the MANET research community.
The proposed key management scheme, Sp.lfOrgP KM, fortunately does not have a real
time requirement and lacks the impl ementation complexity to make it s coding internal
to ns2 infeasible. The effect iveness of the proposed public key man agement scheme was
thus investigated through simulations in the ns-2 simulator (release 2.28) [127], using
the OpenSSL cry ptographic library (version 0.9.7e) [131] to implement the basic modular
arit hmet ic. The proposed scheme was coded as C++ obj ects as a derivative of the appli-
cation and agent classes internal to ns2. The impl ement ati on sup ported the mathemati cal
correct ness of the cryptographic design and confirm ed the low implementation com plexity
of the proposed scheme .
5.5 Simulation Model of SelfOrgPKM
T he ns-2 implementati ons of t he IEEE 802.11b physical layer (P HY) and medium access
cont rol (MAC) protocols were used during the simulation of SelfOrgPKM. The radio
mod el was modified to have a nominal hit-rate of 11 Mh /sec, while supporting a 250 m
transmission range.
The main objective of t he simulation study was to isolate the effect of network layer cert ifi-
cate exchanges on the network performance under different traffic and mobili ty scenarios.
T he size of cert ificates was set to 460 bytes. A modificat ion of t he ns-2 constant bit-rate
(CBR ) traffic generator was used to simulate the connec tion patterns. For all simulations
the CBR packet size was set to 512 bytes, with a total of 50 or 75 networking nodes. The
t raffic loading of the network was vari ed between 1 CBR packet / sec and 7 CBR pack-
ets /sec. With a total of 50 and 75 connect ions resp ecti vely, each node was set to have one
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CBR t raffic source with a single unique destination. This is also referred to as a peer-to-
peer t raffic pat tern. In the first 90 sec of the total 1000 sec of simulat ion t ime all traffic
sources are randomly started in order to force as many nodes as possible to participat e
in t he network layer certificate exchange pro cedure. The network area for all simulat ions
was set to 1000m x 1000m.
T he choice of an appropriate mobility model is a problem and it is unlikely that everybody
will agree with any specific choice. To be consistent with most MANET lit erature the
random waypoint model was chosen to simulate node mobili ty. It can be arg ued that such
a model does not always reflect reality. For example, Capkun et al. [5] pr esent a mobili ty
model which more accurately reflects how nodes would move in reality. This model is
referr ed to as the R estricted Random W aypoint mobili ty model [5]. Rather than choos ing
it s destinat ion as a random point on the plane, a node chooses a destination point from a
finit e set with probability p and a random point with probabili ty 1 - p. This model clearly
fuels the rate that nod es come within "close" range since t hey move towards a common
meeting point with a higher probabili ty.
Afte r extensive investigation m obgen- ss [132] [133] was chosen as a mobility scenario gene-
rator based on the random wayp oint model. Navidi et al. in [132] [133] point out that the
se tdest mobilit y generator included in the ns-2 distribution is flawed. The init ial probab i-
lity distribution of setdest differs at a later point in t ime as it converges to a "steady-st ate
dist ribution" [132] [133]. See [132] [133] for a det ailed analysis of the tnobqen- ss mobi-
lity model. The source code for m obgen- ss is available from the Toilers ad hoc network s
research group (http://toilers.mines .edu) .
In the simulations the mean spee d was set to 5 m / sec and 20 m / sec with a 2 m / sec
vari ance. Since a pause ti me greater than zero reduces t he relative node speed, the pause
t ime was set to zero . For clarity t he simulation par ameters are summarized in Tabl e-5.1.
Sect ion-4.5.5.1 , explained the certificate exchange mechanism of SelfOrgPKM on the net-
work layer. As mentioned before, the certificate exchange procedure of the proposed
scheme is not bound to a specific routing protocol. The details of the routing level cer-
ti ficate exchange implement ati on is dependent on t he route discovery mechanism of a
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Table 5.1: Simulation parameters summary
Simulation par ameter
PRY and MAC mod el
Nominal bit-rate
Transmission range






Node speed var iance
Pause time
Tr affic
Numb er of connections
Traffic st art time
CBR packet size
IEEE 802.11b






Random waypoint - mobgen-ss [132] [133]
5 m/ sec and 20 m/ sec
2 in / sec
osec
1 pkt ./sec to 7 pkt ./sec CBR
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suitable MANET routing protocol. The Ad Hoc On-dem and Dist an ce Vector (AODV)
routing protocol [33] was chosen for the simulations. An AODV agent is conveniently
included in ns-2 (release 2.28), as a wireless network layer model.
SelfOrgP KM's network layer certificate exchange procedure was integrat ed int o the AODV
protocol's route discovery mechanism. AODV allows for route discovery by forwarding a
route request (RRE Q) from the source node to the destination node. Each int ermediat e
node that receives the RREQ caches t he bro adcast ID of the RREQ and captures the
reverse route in its routing t ab le. An intermediat e nod e with a fresh enough route will
reply to the source node with a route reply message (RREP) or forward the RREQ to its
neighbors . If a node receives a RREQ and has already cached the RREQ broad cast ID or
was the originat or of the RREQ, it will disregard the received RREQ.
AODV's RREQ receive function was modified as follows: assum e int ermediate N odec
bro adcasts a RREQ which is received by its neighbor , Noden . As usual N odes, checks
the broadcast ID and RREQ source address for consist ency. N odej, then consults its
reposit ory of received cert ificates to determine whether it has not already received the
cert ificate from N oder.. If the query is positive, N odeD has the certificate of N odec ancl
will cont inue to pro cess the RREQ as usual. If N odeD has not received the RREQ before
and did not origina te the RREQ and cloes not have t he cert ificate of the N odec , two
approaches are defined :
• In the first scenario, N odeD takes an optimistic approach: when N oder, receives
a RREQ from N odec it sends its own certificate t o N odec and pro cesses the RREQ
as normal. If N oder, receives the certificate it will reply to NodeD with its own
cert ificate.
• In the second scenario, N oder, takes a more conservative approach : when N oder,
receives a RREQ from N odec and finds that it does not have N odec 's certificate,
N ode-, will send its own cert ificate to N oder- and disregard the AODV RREQ.
If N odec receives the certificate it will reply to N odeD with its own cert ificate.
AODV is unaware that the RREQ has been received and dropped by Noder, and
will respond to t he scenario as if NodeD is unavailable.
102
Chap t.er-5. Performance and Sec ur it.y Eva luat.ion of t.he Propo sed Peer-t.o-Peer Key l\Ianagem ent. Scheme
It is stressed again that t his mo dification of AODV is not to make t he protocol secure as a
whole. Of primar y interest is t he impa ct of localized peer-to-peer cert ifica te exchange on
t he network performance wh en integr at ed into a pr acti cal IvIANET rou ting protocol. The
two scenarios explained above are partly applicable to pr evious effort s to secure AODV [4U].
If t he first scenar io is used to dist ribute keying m aterial for example to SAODV , t hen user
P i'S base public key !Ii , subordinate pu blic key 11; and public signature parameter 1'; , will
have to be appended to RREQs in ord er for t he next hop to ver ify t he DSA or EIGamal
type signat ures on t he RREQ messages [4U]. This will resul t in addit ional rou tiug overhead
in addit ion to t he single or double RREQ signature extensions . In t he second scenario
t he overhead will be eliminate d at the cost of losing possible ro utes due to dropping t he
RREQ messages .
5.6 Simulation Results of SelfOrgPKM
In t his sect ion t he simulat ion results of SelfOrgP Kl'vI are presented . T he aim is to make an
assesment of SelfOrgPKM 's impact on network performan ce. The followin g two metrics
are obse rved:
• Constant bit-r at e (CBR) packet delivery ratio (P DR) as a fun ct ion of mobili ty, load
and node density.
• CBR packet end-to-end delay as a fun cti on of mobility, load and node density,
T he primary fuuct ion of any comniunication network is to deliver data packets between
end points wit h an acce pt able success rat e and to lerable delay. It is t herefore important
to establish if t he proposed certificate exchange mechanism on t he network layer degrades
t he perform ance of t he network.
In Figure-5.l , t he simulation results for t he optimistic and conserv ative approaches (Section-
5.5), correspond closely with the CBR reference simulation at low mobility (fim/sec mean
with 2 ru /scc vari an ce). As ant icipated an increase in mobili ty (fro m the mean Gm/ sec to
20m/sec) degr ades t he overall performan ce of t he network. Again bot h t he simulations
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CBR • 50 nodes. 5 Ill/sec +
Optimistic Approach - 50 nodes. 5 Ill/sec 0
Conservative Approach • 50 nodes. 5 m/sec 0
CHR - 50 nodes. 20 Ill/sec 6-
Optimistic Approach- 50 nodes. 20 m/sc~ <>
Conservative Approach - 50 nodes. 20 Ill/sec *
Figure 5.1: CBR packet delivery ratio (P DR) %vs load in pkt /sec for 5m/sec and 20m/ sec
mobility with 50 nodes
for the optimistic and conservative approaches follow the CBR reference simulat ion. In
fact with high mobility, t he correlation between all simul ati ons becomes even closer. This
supports the findings of Capkun et al. [5] that mobility can be an advantage in securing
MANETs. The proposed scheme thus also exploits mobili ty to enhance the establishment
of secur ity assoc iations .
Figure-5.2 , shows the PDR vs load resul t s for 75 nodes at a mobility of 5m/ sec and 20
m/ sec. Wi th a maximum difference of 3 % PDR between the reference CBR simulation ,
optimistic approach and conservativ e approach, it is clear that the degradation in perfor-
mance du e to network layer certificate exchanges is insignificant ". Du e to t he localized
nature of the exchange mechanism the protocol copes very well with an increase in node
density. Figur e-5.2, substant iates the earlier claim that mobility improves the correlation
between simulations . T he improved correlat ion as mobility increases can be explained as
follows: in the given simulation setup all nodes initi ally do not share any secur ity asso-
ISee Section-5 .7 for comments (8) on t he scalab ility of t he certificate exchange mechan ism .
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CIlR • 75 nodes. 5 m/sce +
Optimistic Approach - 75 nodes. 5 Ill/sec D
Conserva tive Approach - 75 nodes. 5 Ill/sec 0
CBR • 75 nodes. 20 Ill/sec 6
Optimistic Approach . 75 nodes. 20 Ill/sec 0
Conservative Approach - 75 nodes. 20 m/scc *
F igure 5.2: CBR packet delivery ratio (P DR) % vs load in pkt /sec for 5m/sec and 20m/ sec
mobili ty wit h 75 Ha UCH
cia t ions. Each of the nodes starts to transmit CBR packets to one of the other nodes in
the network. This t riggers a flurry of certificate exchanges on the network layer . At low
mobility this resul ts in some RREQ packets being dropped on the routing layer. As shown
in Figure-fi. S, low mobility extends the period over which RREQ s are dropped. Firstl y,
at higher mobility nodes are more likely to come within each ot hers t ransmission range,
increasing the rate at which nodes set up secur ity associations (sec P igure-fi .S}, This may
be an indicati on that t he proposed network layer certificate exchange mechanism would in
fact perform even bet ter with a mob ility model , such as the Restricted Random Waypo int
mod el [5J. Second ly, at higher mobili ty some nodes within each ot her 's transmission range
have already set up secur ity associations, hence the R.R.EQs t hat are dropped have less
impact on AODV 's ability to route packets to their destinations.
In Figure-5.2, it can be seen that as t he load increases above 3 pkt /sec, with 75 nodes ,
the performance of the network breaks down to an un accept able level. The breakdown
in performance of t he reference CBR simulation with 75 nod es supports t he choice of 50
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Conservative Approach. 50 nodes. 4 pktJscc. Sm/scc --
Conservative Approach . 50 nodes. 4 pkt/scc, 20m/sec ~ - - - - ­
Conservative Approach - 75 nodes.4 pkt/scc. Sill/sec ..
Conservative Approach. 75 nodes. 4 pkt/scc, 20m/sec _._. _..
F igure 5.3: RREQ dropped vs t ime for a 4 pkr./sec load
nod es as the main node density. Some int eresting observations will also be made from the
75 nod e simulation results in due course,
To place the resul ts of P DR vs load into perspective the average end-to-end delay for CBR
packets is included. Figure-5.4 shows that the excha nge of cert ificates on the network layer
does not add significant delay to t he average delivery t ime of CBR packets.
T he CBR end-to-end delay with 75 nod es: shown in Figure-5.5, gives some insight int o t he
interact ion between the AODV rout ing protocol and IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol. Wi thin
the given simulation model (see Sect ion-5.5), each node has a multi-hop connect ion with
one other node in t he network. As intended, t his t riggers as many certificate exchanges
on t he network layer as possible. It will be inform ative to consider the CBR P DR vs load
shown in Figure-5.2 together with the end-t o-end delay in Figur e-5.5. It is noted from
Figure-5.5 t hat at low mobili ty (5 m/ sec) increasing t he loae! above 2 pkt/sec causes an
exponential decrease in performance. The end-to-end delay at 5 m/sec also shows this
clearl y. With an average delay of 0.2 sec at a load of 2 pkt / sec per node, the end-t o-end
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CBR - 50 nodes . 5 m/s cc +
Optimistic Approach - 50 nodes. 5 m/scc 0
Conservative Approach - 50 nodes. 5 Ill/sec 0
CBR • 50 nodes. 20 Ill/sec L
Optimistic Approach - 50 nodes. 20 Ill/ sec 0
Conservative Approach - 50 nodes. 20 Ill/sec *






C8R - 75 nodes. 5 Ill/Sec D
Optimistic Approach - 75 nodes. 5 Ill/sec 0
Conservative Approach - 75 nodes. 5 Ill/sec *
CUR - 75 nodes. 20 Ill/sec +
Optimistic Approach - 75 nodes. 20 Ill/sec 0
Conservative Approach - 75 nodes. 20 Ill/sec 0
Figure 5.5: CBR packet end-to-end delay % vs load for 75 nod es
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delay increases above 1.3 sec for 3 pkt ./sec. In creasin g t he mobili ty to 20 m/ sec worsens
the sit uation. Wi th a 20m/sec mob ility the CBR PDR drops below tiD % at 3 pkt ./scc,
whil e the end-to-end delay increases to about 1 sec . Investi gati on by the author has shown
that t he main reason for this is congestion and packet collisions. Figurc-Ii.G and Figure-
5.7 show t he number of route requests (RRE Qs) sent by AODV as a funct ion of load for
50 and 75 nodes resp ectively. Increasing the number of nodes from 50 to 75 causes a
significant increase in the number of RREQs sent by the routing proto col. For 75 nodes
the number of RREQs increases from approximately 550 000 to 1.2 million. T he rapid
increase in end-to-end delay and decrease in perform ance can be explained in te rms of an
avalanche effect . Increasing the number of nodes, increases the effect ive overall load on
t he network as the number of pkt/ sec sent by each node is increased. This results in t he
AODV routing protocol initi ating more route requests which increases the likelihood of
conges t ion and collisions . The increase in congestion causes more packets to be dropped
by the 802.11 MAC and the increase in collisions cause more packets to be received in
error. Consequently the routes requested by AODV are not established. This causes
AODV to send more RREQs which leads to more congestion and collision. As expected ,
this vicious cycle conti nues un til AODV stabilizes as 802.11 MAC reaches it s maximum
effort . Figure-5.2, 5.5 and 5.7 show that higher mobili ty (20 m/sec) fuels this avalanche
effect as t he rate at which the performance deteriorates, increases significant ly.
5.7 D esign Verification
In t his section it will be argued that the pro posed scheme satis fies all the given design
spec ifications in the problem statement as given in Secti on-4.5.1. F irstly, the generic
req uirements (1 to 8) will be considered:
1. SelfOrgP IG'vI supports a hybrid key management schem e. Once two no des have
exchanged their self-certi ficates they can use their asymmetric keying material to
set up a shared session key. They may want to clo this for efficiency reasons.
2. In Sect ion-5.2.2 a strong, bu t easy to follow, argu ment was provided on the explicit
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CBR - 50 nodes. 5 Ill/Sec +
Optimistic Approach - 50 nodes. 5 m/sec D
Conservative Approach - 50 nodes. 5 m/sec 0
CUR - 50 nodes. 20 m/see D
Optimistic Approach- 50 nodes. 20 m/sec <>
Conservative Approach - 50 nodes. 20 m/sec *










CBR - 75 nodes. 5 m/sec 6.
Optimistic Approach - 75 nodes. 5 m/sec 0
Conservative Approach- 75 nodes. 5 m/sec *
CUR - 75 nodes. 20 m/see +
Optimistic Approac h , 75 nodes. 20 m/sec D
Conservative Approach - 75 nodes. 20 m/sec 0
Figure 5.7: RREQ sent vs load in pkt / sec for 75 nodes
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aut hent icity of a user 's keying material.
3. The security argument in Section-5 .2.2 gives evidence of key independence between
a user 's base privat e key, subordinate private key and renewed subordinate private
keys.
4. The only data t ra nsmit ted between users over the network is public key certificates .
Section-5.2 showed that an act ive, insider adversary cannot forge certificates. Cer-
t ificates are exchanged via t he simple two-round cert ificate exchange mechanism
explained in Section-4.5.5.1. An at t acker may falsely t rigger cert ificate exchanges
between nodes by sending bogus route request s. Note that this is an issue that
has to be solved by the rou ting protocol. Together with the property of key in-
depend ence, SelfOrgP KM also provides resist ance to known key attacks and hence
subsumes forward and backward secrecy (see Sect ion-5.2) .
5. It is claimed that the proposed scheme will remain available as long as nodes can
communicate with other nodes within their transmission range. Clear ly if one-hop
communicat ion is not possible the network is of no use at all. SelfOrgPKM does
not rely on t he routing infrastructure for certificate dissemination. Users in an
"open" wireless network are bound to come into physical contact at least once , in
par ticular if they have data to exchange th at requires high secur ity. They can then
use key establishment mechanisms as detailed in [5] [105] [106] to set up a security
associat ion. Even if they don 't engage in a physical encounter they have to exchange
their network addresses by some out-of-band means , which in the proposed syste m
relates to an authent ic exchange of I D, = H (Yi), where Yi is the base public key of
party i .
6. SelfOrgP KM pr ovides robustness by dist ributing the key man agement serv ice to all
network par ticipants. Schemes t hat make use of an on-line authority (centralized or
distributed) may fail to provide robustness. Similar to [5], SelfOrgPKM requires each
nod e to be its own authority dom ain . Users therefore do not rely on any ot her node
in the network for key man agement services , which minimizes the imp act of hard-
ware/ software failures , network par ti tioning, attacks on the routing mechanisms,
sporadic connectivity et c.
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7. The proposed key man agement scheme is efficient (see Sect ion-5 .3) . The commu-
nication is limi ted to two messages per establishment of a bi-directional secur ity
association between nod e pair s. From the pr esented simulation resul t s it can be
seen that this is however not entirely t rue in a realisti c impleme ntat ion (see Section-
5.6) . Du e to network congestion and packet collisions some certificate exchanges on
the network layer are not successful and therefore a subsequent exchange will be trig-
gered if a route request is received from the same nod e at a later point in t ime . The
efficiency analysis in Secti on-5.3 demonst rates t hat SclfOrgP KM has competit ive
computational requirements and outperforms most of it s counterparts .
8. It is noted that the given simulation model represents the worst case scenar io, since
all nodes form t he network simultaneo usly : when a network is formed , all t he nod es
do not normally join t he communicat ion network at the same ti mo". For example,
assume an "open" MANET is formed in a shopping center; t he probabili ty that all
customers will arr ive at t he shopping center at once , switch on their communication
devices at t he same time and set up a constant bit-rate dat a connection, is highly
unlikely. In fact t he aut hor strongly agrees with Steiner et al. [46J that ad hoc
networks will exhibit t he prop erti es of dyn amic peer groups (DP Gs) . From t he
simulation res ults it can be seen that if t he network starts off with 100 or fewer
nod es (even if t hey join simultaneously as in t he worst case simulat ion mod el) t he
proposed scheme will not have scalability problems even if t he network grows to
thousands of nodes. Unfort unate ly this claim is only intuitively suppo rte d as the
reso urces to simulate such lar ge networks are not readily available.
In ns-2 a simulation with 75 nodes in SelfOrgPKM 's simulation model produce
tracefiles as lar ge as 15 GB (with MAC and network level tracing enabled) . The
simulations with te n desktop computers'' took just over 72 hours to complete. The
simulat ion parameters in Table-5 .1 combined with the scenarios expla ined in the
simulation model, gives a total of 840 simulations . Each computer thus took six
days to complete 84 sim ulations , which includes t he time to process the tracefilcs.
2 Alt hough SelfOrgPKM 'ti simulation model is ext reme, the effect of localized certificate exchange on
the network layer could be observed wit h ati many certificate excha nges triggered as possib le,
3Model: HP D5::10, CP U: Pentium 4 2.8 GHz at 5::13 MHz FSB, RAl\f : 512MB DDR SDRAM Hard
Disk: Samsung SP-0411N 7200/ 133, Op erati ng Syst em: Linux SuSe 9.3 Pro. '
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Clearly increasing the node density in the given simulation model to more t han 100
nodes creates logistic imp ossibiliti es .
Now t ha t it has been shown that t he proposed scheme satisfies t he generic requirements
for a key man agement scheme, t he remaining self-impose d specificat ions (9 to 18, Section-
4.5.1) is investi gated:
9. As mentioned before , t he proposed key man agement scheme only requires users to
exchange their self-certificates during the on-line post-initi alizati on ph ase. The use
of the routing control packets to trigger the certificat e exchanges avoids introducing
any ot her message ty pes or extending the size of the rout ing packets . The certifi-
cate exchange mechanism of SelfOrgPKM is completely on-d emand. The proposed
scheme only exchanges keying material between nodes that are required to secure
the routing infrastruct ur e in a localized context . Users exchange keying material on
the app lication layer on a need-to-know basis if they want to communicate securely.
10. SclfOrgPKM 's certificate exchange mechanism explained in Section-4.5.5.1 breaks
the rout ing-secur ity interdepend ence cycle. As pointed out in (5) above, t he pro-
posed scheme does not rely on the routing infrastructure at all.
11. The use of crypto-based identifiers [110] [45], solves the address ownership problem .
To the best of t he author 's knowledge it is th e only way to solve this problem without
any form of trusted authority.
12. SelfOrgPKl'vI's basic assumpt ion is that each node is its own authority domain (si-
milar to [5]) . The key man agement scheme is not dependent on any form of on-line
TT P or user collaboration. The adversary will not gain different levels of advantage
by compromising different nodes. Compromising any node and any number of nodes
will not effect the ope ration of SelfOrg P KM .
1 ~ . The simulation results discussed in Sect ion-5 .G show that mobili ty docs not effect
the proposed scheme . In fact , higher mobili ty lessens the impact of the network layer
cert ificate exchange mechanism on the network performance.
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14. Although SelfOrgPKM exploits mobility, it does not rely on mobility in any way:
nodes exchange cert ificates in a self-organized fashion and can therefore support
secure routing without depending on users to have physical encounte rs.
15. In Section-5.6 it is shown that the proposed scheme has a negligible imp act on the
network performance, both in te rms of packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay.
On the other hand, the routing protocol will not find any rout es if the necessar y
security associ at ion is not esta blished (see Section-5.5 for an explanat ion of the
conservative approach). The proposed scheme therefore introduces no noticeable
time delay in the sett ing up of of securi ty associat ions.
16. In Secti on-5.2 the secur ity of SelfOrgPKM is discussed. The secur ity of the sign ature
scheme is proved in ROM+GM and it is shown that subordina te public keys cannot
be forged based on the security of the signature scheme and the int ract ability of the
discrete logarithmic problem.
17. The proposed scheme, SelfOrgPKM has very low impl ementation complexity. The
only crypt ographic primitives required are a random number generato r, the modifi ed
EIGam al signature scheme (Sect ion-4.3) and a suitable hash functi on . Note t hat the
proposed subordinate public key generation scheme (Sect ion-4 .4) is based on the
modified EIG am al signa ture scheme. The modifications to the routing protocol is
regarded as minor.
18. Lastly it is noted that the scheme is fully modularized . All the mechanisms of Self-
OrgP KM (ra ndom number generator, hash function, signature scheme, subordinate
public key generation/renewal scheme and certificate exchange mechanism ) can be
used as secure building blocks in ot her applications.
5.8 On the Shortcomings of SelfOrgPKM
T he main deficiency of the proposed peer-to-peer key management scheme is that nod es
can generate more than one identi ty. As mentioned in Section-2.l. 3, this is however an
inh erent disadvant age of fully self-organized schemes [12].
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SelfOrgP KI\vI's cert ificate revocat ion mechanism may not appear to be extensive (see
Sedion-4.5.5.2). Cert ificate revocation mechanisms for MANETs normally rely on some
thres hold t of nod es to agree on revoking a cert ificate . In the presence of adversaries with
multiple identi ties this approach docs not make much sense . Certificate revocation in
fully self-organized MANETs is a very difficult problem. It is expecte d that the cert ificate
revocation problem may be port ialls) solved with an appropriate trust model and vari ous
node misb ehavior det ection mechanisms; in "open" networks , a mali cious node can rejoin
the network with a new ident ity once excluded.
The proposed scheme 's cer tificate exchange mechanism focuses primarily on establishing
security associat ions for the routing infrastructure. Self-organized applicat ion level key es-
tablishment techniques for SelfOrgPKM is not explicitly defined . SelfOrgPKM's methods
need to be int egrated with those defined in [5] [lOfi] [lOG] to effect ively set IIp security
associat ions on both t he network and ap plicat ion layer .
The cert ificate exchange mechanism may not provide adequate cert ificate dissemination
for all the exist ing secure rou ting protocols. Consequent ly, eit her the cert ificate exchange
mechanism or t he rou ting protocol will have to be enhanced to distribute all t he needed
cert ificates. This will par ticularly be required in low mobility scenar ios.
5.9 Conclusion
The thesis cont ributes a novel peer- to-peer key man agement scheme for fully self-organized
mobile ad hoc networks, called Self-Organiz ed Peer-to-Peer Key Man agement (SelfOr g-
P KM) , The scheme has low impl ementation complexity and provides self-organiz ed me-
chanisms for cert ificate dissemin ation and key renewal without tho need for any form of
off-line or on-line authority.
The fully distribu ted scheme is superior in communication and comput at ional overhead
with respect to its counterparts [1] [2] [65] [3] . All nodes send and receive t he same num-
ber of messages an d complete the same amount of computation. SelfOrgPKM therefore
pr eserves the symmetric relat ionship between the nod es. Each nod e is its own authority
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domain which provides an adversary with no convenient point of at tack.
SelfOrg P KM solves the classical routing-security int erdependency problem and mitigat es
impersonat ion attacks by providing a strong one-to-one binding between a user 's certificate
informat ion and public key.
The thesis also introduces two generic cryptographic building blocks as t he basis of SelfOrg-
PKM: 1) A variant on the EIGamal ty pe signature scheme developed from the generalized
EIGamal signature scheme introduced by Horster et al. The modified scheme is one of
t he most efficient EIGamal vari ants, out performing most of the ot her vari ants; and 2) A
subordinate key generation scheme.
The thesis int roduces t he novel noti on of subordina te public keys, which allow the users
of SelfOrgPKM to perform self-organized, public key revocati on without changing t heir
network identifiers/ addresses. Sub ordinat e public keys t herefore eliminate t he main weak-
ness of previous efforts to solve the address ownership pro blem in Mobile IPv6 [110] [45].
Furthermore, t he main weakn ess of previous efforts to break the rou ting-security int er-
depend ence cycle in MANETs [92] is also eliminate d by using a subordinate public key
mechanism. The present ed EIGam al vari ant was proved to be secure in ROM +GM (Theo-
rem 1) without making any unrealisti c assumpt ions. It was shown how t he strong secur ity
of t he signature scheme supports the secur ity of the prop osed subordinate key generation
scheme . The philo sophy behind SelfOrgPKM's secur ity argument is well described by
Kobli tz and Menezes in [119].
T he only operation of SelfOrgP KM affecting the network is the pairwise exchange of cer-
t ificat es. The cryptographic correctness , low impl ement at ion complexity and effectiveness
of SelfOrgP KM were verified though simulation using ns-2 and Op enSSL. The simula-
t ion results show that the novel, localized certificate exchange mechanism on t he network
layer has negligible impact on network performance. The simulation results fur thermore
demonstrate that network layer cert ificate exchanges can be t riggered without exte nding
routing protocol cont rol packets.
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Conclusions and Future Direction
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have some unique characterist ics t hat make the design
of suitable secur ity mechanisms both challenging and interesting. The secur ity issues in
MANETs will have t o be resolved before these networks will find wide scale deployment .
An important differentiation can be made between different types of MANETs based on
the use of a trust ed authority. This work focused on key man agement in "open" or fully
self-organized MANETs. The lack of any form of truste d authority makes the design of a
low complexit y key man agement scheme for "open" MANETs a difficult task.
The first par t of this thesis st arted with a detailed explanation of the characterist ics
of MANETs fro m a secur ity perspective. This was followed by a brief overvi ew of the
applicat ion of MANETs, both in a military and commercial setting. These applications
serve as the driving force behind numerous resear ch initiatives. A wide range of security
issues in MANETs was summari zed and key management was identified as one of the main
secur ity problems.
In the second part of the thesis a det ailed sur vey on t he exist ing key management schemes
was given. T he prop osals were subdivided based on t heir mai n characteristics or design
approach. The survey considered schemes t hat make use of both off-line and on-line
truste d authority or neither of the two; the discussion and comments on each subset are
applicable to the design of key management scheme for "open" and "closed" MANETs.
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The third par t of t he thesis conveyed the main contribut ion. A novel peer-to-peer key
man agement scheme for fully self-organized MANETs, called Self-Organized Peer-to-Peer
Key Management (SelfOrgP KM) was proposed. The scheme has low complexity and a
strong secur ity argument . The scheme is fully distributed and provides an adversary with
no single point of at tack. SelfOrgPKM solves the address ownership problem wit h crypto-
based ident ifiers as prop osed hy O'Shea et at. SelfOrgP KlVI breaks the rou ti ng-securi ty
inte rdependence cycle wit h a novel cert ificate exchange mechanism. The key dist ribution
scheme exploits the cont rol packets of t he rou ting pro tocol to trigger certificate exchanges
on-demand. SelfOrgP KM 's cert ificate disseminat ion mechanism is thus able to est ablish
secur ity associations in a localized context as required by t he routing infrast ru cture. AI-
to ugh SelfOrgPKl'vI fully exploits mob ility to enhance t he setup of t he secur ity associat ions,
the scheme does not rely on mobili ty at all. It was shown t hrough analysis and simula-
tions tha t SelfOrgP KM has negligible imp act on t he performance of the network. T he
certificate exchange mechanism introduces no noti ceable t ime delay in providing keying
material for t he rout ing mechanism.
As building hlocks for t he prop osed peer-to-peer key management scheme a variant on the
El Gam al signature scheme was presented and a new subordinate pu blic key generation
scheme was proposed . The secur ity of the signature scheme was proved in the Random
Oracle and Generic Secur ity Model (ROM+GM). Sub ordinate public keys are a novel
notion which allows users to generate a secondary public key from their original or base
pub lic key. It is well known that the use of cryptographic keys degrades their secur ity
level, hence t he need for a key renewal mechanism. If only t he subordinate pu blic key is
used for real communication it leaves the adversary with a brute-force at tack on t he base
pr ivate key as the only opt ion for break ing the syst em.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
T he following lists t he cont ribut ions of t he thesis:
• A comprehensive survey and analysis on the exist ing key management schemes for
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MANETs.
• A novel peer-to-peer key man agement scheme for fully self-orga nized MANETs that
exploits user mobili ty, bu t does not depend on mobility in any way.
• A novel cert ificate exchange mechanism that breaks the rou ting-security interd e-
pend ence cycle by dccoupling the key distribution scheme from the routing infr a-
st ructure . It elimina tes any delay in the set up of secur ity associations: the routing
infr astructure can therefore be secured at the start of network formation .
• A novel notion called subordinate public keys which eliminates the main weakness
of previous efforts to solve the address owners hip prob lem in Mobile IP v6. Further-
more, it solves the main weakness of previous efforts to break the rou ting-security
int erdepend ence cycle in MANETs.
• An efficient vari ant of the ElG amal signature scheme, proved secure in ROM+GM.
6. 2 Direction for Future R esearch
Future work related to key management includes the following:
• The pr oposed certificate exchange mechanism will be enhanced and simulated in
more realistic mobility mod els as presented in [134]. It will also be interest ing to
see, for example , how large one can make th e certificates before t hey st art to degrade
the network performance. The certificate exchange mechanism will be optimized to
come closer to the lower bound of two messages per establishment of a hi-direction
security association.
• The capa bilit ies of an adversary with multiple identi t ies will have to be considered
before "open" MANETs will become feasibl e.
• Syste m parameter agreement without any form of t rusted aut hority or user int erac-
tion is an issue t hat needs investigation.
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• The prop osed peer-to-peer key man agement scheme for fully self-organized MANETs
is ideally suited to securing the rou ting infrastructure. As mentioned before, it
falls short when it comes to secur ing communication oil the network layer. Future
work includes an intergr ation of SelfOrgPKM with mechanisms for authent icate d
key agreement on the application layer.
• In ord er to provide a stronger secur ity argument for the next fully self-orga nized key
management scheme, the proposed subordinate public key generation scheme will
be proved secure in t he Random Oracle and Generic Secur ity Model (ROM+ GM).
• A key man agement scheme for self-organized MANETs has been investigated [135]
[136]. It complete ly eliminates the need for an on-line authority and is ideally sui ted
for "closed" or military type MANETs. It uses an off-line trust ed authority to boot-
strap the system and can therefore provide strong access cont rol. An int eresting
feature of the scheme is that the off-line aut hority does not learn the pri vate keys of
users. This prop erty may be essent ial in some MANET applications. Future work in-
clud es simulat ion of the scheme in realistic mobili ty models and further development
of a st rong security argument .
• Group key man agement is still an open problem in MAl\'ETs. Preliminary inves-
tigations has been complete d [126] [137]. The next step is to complete simulat ions
in ord er to est ablish the sui t ability of convent ional wireline group key management
techniques for MANETs .
• Key management in vehicular ad hoc networks is a complex open problem to be
investigat ed in fut ure .
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